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Abstract
Three Essays on Substructural Approaches to Semantic Paradoxes
by
Brian Cross Porter

Adviser: Professor Graham Priest

This dissertation consists of three papers:

Supervaluations and the Strict-Tolerant Hierarchy
In a recent paper, Barrio, Pailos and Szmuc (BPS) show that there are logics that have
exactly the validities of classical logic up to arbitrarily high levels of inference. They suggest
that a logic therefore must be identified by its valid inferences at every inferential level.
However, Scambler shows that there are logics with all the validities of classical logic at
every inferential level, but with no antivalidities at any inferential level. Scambler concludes
that in order to identify a logic, we at least need to look at the validities and the antivalidities
of every inferential level. In this paper, I argue that this is still not enough to identify a
logic. I apply BPS’s techniques in a super/sub-valuationist setting to construct a logic that
has exactly the validities and antivalidities of classical logic at every inferential level. I argue
that the resulting logic is nevertheless distinct from classical logic.

Infinite-Premise Paradoxes and Contraction
In recent years, there have been several defenses of noncontractive solutions to semantic
paradoxes. These solutions propose that we avoid paradox by dropping the structural rule

v
of Contraction, and allow that a premise taken twice have different consequences than the
premise taken only once. This repeats for every n: a premise taken n+1 times has different
consequences than a premise taken only n times. This solution runs into trouble when we
consider contexts that allow for infinitely many premises, since ℵ0 ` 1 “ ℵ0 . In this paper,
I introduce infinitary versions of several semantic paradoxes, which involve infinitely many
premises and therefore cannot be solved by noncontractive approaches. I argue that noncontractive solutions cannot avoid this problem, and that noncontractive solutions therefore
fail to provide a uniform solution to semantic paradoxes.

An Infinite Hierarchy of Validity Curry Paradoxes
A version of Curry’s paradox involving a validity predicate (hereafter the validity curry
paradox ) has in recent years been presented as a particular problem for non-classical theories
of truth that don’t want to go substructural. In this paper, I introduce an infinite hierarchy
of validity curry paradoxes that apply to metainferential validity. None of these paradoxes
can be solved by giving up the usual Cut or Contraction. I argue that any attempt to block
every paradox in the hierarchy at the same step faces serious problems. In particular, the
substructuralist must reject Cut or Contraction at every metainferential level, which has
worse results than rejecting either rule at the first level alone. I propose a solution that
keeps all of the usual structural rules, but rejects different validity rules at different levels. I
argue that this is nevertheless a uniform solution.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
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The papers presented here examine substructural approaches to semantic paradoxes.
Substructural approaches to semantic paradoxes advocate dropping one of the structural
rules, usually either Cut or Contraction, in order to solve paradoxes of truth and validity. I
will use a sequent calculus presentation throughout, as a sequent calculus presentation will
make it easier to see the structural rules used in derivations, and will also make it easier
to see the role of metainferences in our later investigation of metainferential paradoxes. We
are interested in validity, and the sequent calculus provides a convenient way to prove which
inferences are valid.
The classical sequent calculus LK involves sequents of the form Γ ñ ∆. Both Γ and
∆ are understood to be multisets. Therefore Γ, A ñ ∆ is equivalent to A, Γ ñ ∆, but
Γ, A, A ñ ∆ is not equivalent to Γ, A ñ ∆.
LK has two sorts of rule: structural rules, and operational rules.
The structural rules are Identity, Weakening, Cut, and Contraction:

AñA

Identity

Γ ñ ∆ Weakening (left)
Γ, A ñ ∆
Γ ñ ∆ Weakening (right)
Γ ñ B, ∆
Γ, A, A ñ ∆
Contraction (left)
Γ, A ñ ∆
Γ ñ B, B, ∆
Contraction (right)
Γ ñ B, ∆
Γ, A ñ ∆
Γ1 ñ A, ∆1
Cut
Γ, Γ1 ñ ∆, ∆1
Any logic that drops one of these structural rules is a substructural logic. Logics that
drop Identity are called “irreflexive”; logics that drop Weakening are “nonmonotonic”; logics
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that drop Contraction are called “noncontractive”; and logics that drop Cut are called
“nontransitive”. Noncontractive and nontransitive logics have been much more popular as
solutions to semantic paradoxes than irreflexive logics, and so I will primarily focus on those
two approaches. Nonmonotonic logics have been defended,1 and some of the noncontractive
logics put forward as solutions to semantic paradoxes have been also been nonmonotonic. But
since Identity and Weakening are not directly involved in the derivations of every paradox—
in particular, they appear to play no role in the validity curry paradox—irreflexive and
nonmonotonic approaches do not automatically solve all of the semantic paradoxes that
concern us.
In addition to structural rules, LK also has operational rules. These are rules that
introduce logical operators like ␣ and _. Each operator has two rules: one left-side rule,
and one right-side rule. These are:
Γ ñ A, ∆
␣L
Γ␣A ñ ∆
Γ, A ñ ∆
␣R
Γ ñ ␣A, ∆
Γ, A ñ ∆
Γ1 , B ñ ∆1
_L
Γ, Γ1 , A _ B ñ ∆, ∆1
Γ ñ A, B, ∆
_R
Γ ñ A _ B, ∆
ΓA, B ñ ∆
^L
ΓA ^ B ñ ∆
Γ ñ A, ∆
Γ1 ñ B, ∆1
^R
Γ, Γ1 ñ A ^ B, ∆, ∆1
Γ ñ A, ∆
Γ1 , B ñ ∆1
ÑL
Γ, Γ1 , A Ñ B ñ ∆, ∆1
1

See for example [8].
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Γ, A ñ B, ∆
ÑR
Γ ñ A Ñ B, ∆

With these structural and operational rules, we can derive a sequent Γ ñ ∆ in LK iff
Γ $ ∆ is a valid inference in classical logic. For example, we can derive classically valid
inferences like modus ponens:
Identity
Identity
AñA
BñB
ÑL
A, A Ñ B ñ B
the Law of Excluded Middle:
Identity
AñA
␣R
ñ A, ␣A
_R
ñ A _ ␣A
and Explosion:
Identity
AñA
␣L
A, ␣A ñ
^L
A ^ ␣A ñ Weakening (right)
A ^ ␣A ñ B
As a result, non-classical approaches that aim to solve semantic paradoxes by dropping
LEM or Explosion will have to restrict or reject some of the rules of LK. However, different
paradoxes involve different connectives: the curry paradox involves a conditional, the liar
paradox involves negation, and the validity curry predicate involves neither. This has led
defenders of the substructural approach to argue that other non-classical approaches fail to
provide a uniform solution to semantic paradoxes.
In our attempts to solve semantic paradoxes, much importance is placed on the notion
of uniformity. As Priest phrases it in [7]: “same kind of paradox, same kind of solution.”
One of the appeals of substructural approaches to semantic paradoxes is that they appear to provide undeniably uniform solutions: every paradoxical argument is blocked at the
exact same step. Thus regardless of which paradoxes are “of the same kind”, substructural
approaches are guaranteed to provide the “same kind” of solution to those paradoxes.
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Defenders of substructural approaches argue that other non-classical approaches do not
provide a uniform solution, because they must block negation rules for the liar, conditional
rules for the curry, and so on. See, for example, Ripley [13]:
“The real problem with [nonsubstructural approaches]... is this: the nonsubstructuralist deals with the paradoxes piecemeal, missing the general features that are
allowing them to arise in the first place. But paradox runs deeper than any particular vocabulary. Tinkering with negation or conditional rules might prevent
paradoxes involving negations and conditionals from arising, but it doesn’t come
to grips with the general phenomenon.”
The charge again non-substructural approaches, then, is that they do not solve the general
phenomenon underlying the semantic paradoxes. They provide specific solutions to specific
paradoxes, but fail to provide any solution that solves the paradoxes in full generality.
However, I argue that it is substructural approaches that do not “come to grips with the
general phenomenon”, because substructural logics simply ignore many of the contexts in
which we want to use logics, and in which paradoxes can arise.
We use logic, and we use logics, for many purposes. And for many purposes, substructural
logics can be very useful.
For example, Ripley [12] gives an bilateralist account of the nontransitive ST consequence
relation, such that Γ $ ∆ is understood to mean that it is incoherent to assert all of the
γs while denying all of the δs. On this understanding, Cut fails precisely for sentences that
cannot be coherently asserted or denied. This may be a useful consequence relation that can
serve valuable purposes. In [4], Kripke suggests that paradoxical and ungrounded sentences
like the liar sentence fail to express a proposition. One may take assertion and denial to
essentially involve assertion or denial of propositions, and thus take the liar sentence to
be neither assertible nor deniable. In that case, we might think that ST gives the right
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consequence relation for determining which sets of assertions and denials are impermissible.
And we furthermore might take this to be valuable to give an inferentialist account of the
meanings of the logical connectives. In this way, the nontransitive consequence relation
might be a very useful tool.
Similarly, Mares and Paoli [5] describe one sense in which we might say that A “follows
from” Γ. Namely, that A follows from Γ if “given the rules of the logic at issue, we can extract
the information that A from the combined information provided by the sentences in Γ” [5].
They argue that the structural rule of Contraction fails for this notion of “follows from”,
because given the rules of a particular logic, we sometimes need more than one application of
a particular premise in the proof of a theorem. There may be a proof of B that uses A twice,
and there may be no proof of B that uses A only once. In such a case, structural Contraction
fails: given the rules of the logic at issue, two applications of A suffice to prove B, but one
does not. This notion of consequence avoid semantic paradoxes because, for example, we
need two applications of the curry sentence in order to derive an arbitrary sentence; there
is no proof of an arbitrary sentence that only requires one application of a curry sentence. I
think this notion of “follows from” is a perfectly legitimate notion, and that a noncontractive
notion of consequence may therefore be very useful to investigate these sorts of features of a
particular logic.
Nontransitive and noncontractive consequence relations are well-suited to serve these purposes. However, there are many other purposes for which we want a logic, and substructural
logics simply cannot serve all of these purposes. One of the most important uses of a logic
is to discover the consequences of a collection of premises. Given a collection of axioms, or
assumptions, or beliefs, we want to know what those axioms/assumptions/beliefs commit us
to. This is an important part of how we use logic informally, in our daily lives, but it is
also an important use of formal logics in mathematics and other areas. We want to know
whether or not Goldbach’s Conjecture is a consequence of the axioms of ZFC, for example.
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One important role of a logic is to provide a tool that can be used to discover these sorts of
consequences.
For a logic to serve this purpose, the consequence relation of the logic must form a closure
operator. A closure operator C(X) is an operator on sets (or multisets) such that:
1. X Ď CpXq
2. if X Ď Y then CpXq Ď CpY q
3. CpXq “ CpCpXq
If a consequence relation $ corresponds to a closure operator CpXq, such that Γ $ A iff
A P CpΓq, then it must obey the usual structural rules.
(1) gives us identity: A $ A
(2) gives us monotonicity: Γ $ A implies Γ, B $ A
(3) gives us “Cautious Cut”: Γ $ A and Γ, A $ B implies Γ $ B.
Together, (1), (2), and (3) make both Cut and Contraction derivable rules in our logic.
As such, no nontransitive or noncontractive logics can correspond to a closure operator.
This has several problems, one of which is that we cannot use such a logic to discover the
consequences of a collection of axioms.
Normally we can take e.g. the axioms of ZFC, and know that there is a singular set of
theorems provable from those axioms. This is the closure of the axioms. To quote Beall:
“Give to logic your theory Γ, and then sit back: logic ‘freely’ or ‘automatically’ expands
your theory to CpΓq, which contains all of Γ’s (singleton) consequences” [2].
This power of a logic is dependent on it corresponding to a closure operator. Without a
closure operator, we cannot use a logic to present the entirety of a theory using just a set
of non-logical axioms. Therefore, whatever other benefits they may provide, noncontractive
and nontransitive logics do not have this power.
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The traditional view is that a logic is a consequence relation, where a consequence relation
is a set of valid inferences. This can be at least partially traced back to Tarski. However,
the notion of consequence relation that Tarski uses is that of a single-conclusion consequence
relation that is reflexive, transitive, and monotonic; see for example [15]. This “Tarskian”
notion of consequence relation simply does not apply to substructural logics. As Barrio et
al. discuss in [1] in the context of nontransitive logics, and as Cintula and Paoli discuss in [3]
in the context of noncontractive logics, substructural consequence relations are not Tarskian
consequence relations. If we want to discuss substructural logics, we must “move beyond the
Tarksian paradigm”, as Barrio et al. put it in [1].
Moving beyond the Tarskian paradigm has many consequences. One consequence, which
I discuss in the first paper presented here, is that we can no longer identify a logic just by
its set of valid inferences. Barrio et al., Scambler, and Fitting paint a clear picture: given a
logic with a Tarskian consequence relation like that of classical logic, K3, LP, or FDE, and
there is a substructural logic with the same valid inferences that nevertheless differs in other
ways.
Another consequence is that not every logic we may consider can be used for all of the
purposes for which we usually want a logic. Because they do not correspond to closure
operators, substructural logics cannot be used to determine the consequences of a collection
of non-logical axioms like ZFC.
This is not to say that every logic must have a consequence relation that corresponds to
a closure operator. There is nothing conceptually incoherent about a consequence relation
that does not correspond to a closure operator. Non-Tarskian consequence relations are
perfectly coherent. But any such consequence relation cannot be used to expand a theory
in this way. Given that we at least sometimes want to use a logic in order to determine
the consequences of a collection of axioms, we at least sometimes need to have a logic that
corresponds to a closure operator.
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Classical logic, paracomplete logics, and paraconsistent logics all do this: they each correspond to a closure operator, and allow us to use the logic to specify a single theory consisting
of the consequences of those axioms. But substructural logics do not. For situations in which
we need a closure operator, substructural logics cannot help us.
This suggests that substructural approaches are not really solving the paradoxes in all of
the contexts in which we care about them, as much as they are simply changing the subject.
Quine [9] and Slater [14] objected to non-classical approaches to semantic paradox on the
grounds that these approaches did not solve the paradoxes, but merely changed the subject.
According to this objection, the liar paradox is formulated with a negation that obeys the
classical negation rules. Introducing a logic with a negation that obeys different, weaker
rules is simply changing languages, not solving the paradox as formulated in the original
language.
Non-classical logicians have discussed and answered this objection.2 But there is a similar,
and I think deeper, version of the objection to be raised against the substructural approaches.
Both the nontransitive and the noncontractive approaches to paradox propose that there
is something wrong with cumulative reasoning: one cannot safely start with a collection of
premises, reason towards conclusions, add those conclusions to their collection, and repeat
the process. Cumulative reasoning requires Cautious Cut, and Cautious Cut is ruled out
by both nontransitive and noncontractive approaches.3 But the fact of the matter is that
much of what we want to do—in mathematics, in philosophy, and in our daily lives—requires
cumulative reasoning.4
2

See especially chapters 4 and 5 of [6].
See, e.g., Ripley: “So neither the noncontractivist nor the nontransitivist can fully approve of cumulative
reasoning. They diagnose different problems with it, and quarrel with different instances, but to the extent
that cumulative reasoning is nonnegotiable, both noncontractive and nontransitive approaches are simply
ruled out.” [10].
4
It does not help the situation to say that cumulative reasoning only fails in certain specific circumstances.
Kripke [4] demonstrated quite convincingly that paradoxes can arise in our everyday lives, and so taking the
substructural approach seriously would require giving up on cumulative reasoning in general.
3
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The nontransitive and noncontractive approaches provide powerful tools that may serve
us well in cases in which cumulative reasoning is not needed. These logics can provide
perfectly useful consequence relations, that may apply well to many purposes. But the
question nevertheless remains: when we need to reason cumulatively, what inferences are
safe for us to make? To that question, the substructural approaches provide no answer.
They simply change the subject.
The three papers presented here aim to illustrate some of the ways in which the noncontractive and nontransitive approaches are simply changing the subject. These logics can
only solve the paradoxes as they apply to very particular, specialized notions of validity.
But they do not solve paradoxes in full generality, and they do not solve the paradoxes as
they apply to the notions of validity that are most important to us: the notions that allow
for cumulative reasoning, that allow for the preservation of truth and justification and other
desirable properties, and that tell us the consequences of the premises and axioms that we
accept.
In the first paper, I argue that one of the essential features of a logic is the consequences
that the logic provides for a collection of non-logical axioms. I show that two logics that
have all the same validities and antivalidities (to be defined in the paper) at every inferential
level can still give different consequences for the same axioms. I argue that one of the key
reasons that we want a logic is to discover the consequences of a collection of axioms or
assumptions. I argue that this poses a problem for nontransitive logics that go nontransitive
“all the way up”.
In the second paper, I present infinitary paradoxes that cause problems even in logics
without the structural rule of contraction. These paradoxes involve infinitely many premises,
and thus Contraction is in some sense “built in” and cannot be avoided. I argue that this is
a symptom of a general phenomenon: noncontractive logics cannot be used to discover the
consequences of a collection of axioms or assumptions. I argue that this is a problem for non-
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contractive approaches, as it means that we cannot use them to determine the consequences
of collections of non-logical axioms like ZFC.
In the third paper, I introduce a metainferential hierarchy of validity curry paradoxes. I
show that the validity curry paradox reappears at every level of inference, using metainferential versions of the rules involved in the original validity curry paradox. I argue that, if
we take a uniform solution to the validity curry paradoxes to mean blocking the same step
of the argument at every level, which is the notion of uniformity to defend substructural
approaches, then no uniform solution is appealing. In particular, the nontransitive and noncontractive approaches must go nontransitive or noncontractive “all the way up”, which is
worse than giving up either rule at the first level alone. I then propose a solution on which
we keep all of the usual structural rules, but block different validity rules at different levels.
I argue that this is nevertheless a uniform solution.
The papers presented here are meant to be self-contained, and can be read in any order.
The first paper has been published in the Journal of Philosophical Logic; the third paper
is an expanded version of a paper presented to the Buenos Aires Logic Group’s Work In
Progress Seminar, and to the CUNY Graduate Center’s Logic and Metaphysics Workshop.
The papers can be read in any order, though each paper makes brief references to the papers
that come before them.
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Introduction

There are several different logics available: classical logic, intuitionistic logic, the Strong
Kleene logic K3, Priest’s Logic of Paradox LP, supervaluationism, subvaluationism, etc.
These logics are uncontroversially distinct: no one is under the impression that LP and
intuitionistic logic are really two ways of presenting one and the same logic. However, the
same logic can be formulated in different ways. Classical logic, for example, can be formulated
in a natural deduction system, or a Hilbert-style calculus, or a multiple-conclusion sequent
calculus. Classical logic can also be given a variety of semantics, and can be given several
different axiomatizations. Yet all of these, intuitively, are simply different ways of presenting
the same logic.
How can we identify a logic? Given two systems, how can we determine whether they are
distinct logics, or are merely different presentations of the same logic? This is harder than it
first seems. As a first pass, we might be tempted to say that a logic should be identified by
its axioms and rules of inference. But this is too strict: it would count different formulations
of classical logic as distinct logics, when in fact they are just different presentations of the
same logic.
We might say that a logic should be identified by its set of theorems: the sentences that
are derivable in the proof theory or get designated values at all models in the semantics.
But this is too lax; classical logic, supervaluationism and Priest’s paraconsistent logic LP all
have the same theorems, and yet are uncontroversially distinct logics. One reason they are
distinct is that they validate different inferences. For example, A, A Ñ B ñ B is valid in
classical logic and supervaluationism, but not in LP, while A _ B ñ A, B is valid in classical
logic and LP but not in supervaluationism.1
We might therefore try to identify a logic by looking at its set of valid inferences. However,
1

I specifically have in mind here supervaluationism with what Williamson [41] calls the global consequence
relation.
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this is also too lax. Two logics can agree on which inferences are valid, but disagree on which
meta-inferences are valid. The logic ST, for example, introduced by Cobreros, Egré, Ripley
and van Rooj (hereafter CERvR) in [8] and [9], has exactly the valid inferences of classical
logic, but does not validate the meta-inferential Cut rule. It is therefore distinct from classical
logic, which validates every instance of Cut.
We therefore must at least look at which metainferences are valid. But even the inferences
and metainferences of a logic are not enough to identify a logic. In a recent paper, Barrio,
Pailos and Szmuc (hereafter BPS) show that there are logics that have exactly the validities
of classical logic up to arbitrarily high inference levels (in a sense to be made precise below),
but then differ from classical logic after that [2]. Fitting [18] shows that this generalizes
beyond classical logic; for K3, LP, FDE, and more, there are logics that have the exact same
validities up to arbitrarily high levels of inference, but then differ at higher levels. BPS argue
that this means that a logic must by identified by its valid inferences at every inferential
level.
However, even this will not do the job. In a recent paper, Scambler builds on BPS’s
result, and shows that there are logics that have exactly the validities of classical logic at
every level, and yet do not have the antivalidities of classical logic at any level (where an
antivalidity is an inference such that every model is a counterexample to that inference) [36].
Fitting [17] shows that this also generalizes; there are logics that have the same validities as
K3 or LP or FDE, yet do not have the same antivalidities. Scambler argues that this means
that for two systems L and L’ to be the same logic, they must at least have all of the same
validities and antivalidities at every inferential level.
In this paper, I argue that this too is insufficient; there is a logic that has exactly the
same validities and exactly the same antivalidities as classical logic at every inferential level,
and yet is still intuitively distinct from classical logic.2 In section 2.2 I introduce the logical
2

I leave the question of whether this result generalizes beyond classical logic for future work.
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framework that I’ll be using in the rest of the paper. In section 2.3 I apply BPS’s methods in
a super/sub-valuationist framework, to construct notions of validity for inferences of every
inferential level that have exactly the validities and antivalidities of classical logic. In section
2.4 I argue that the resulting logic is distinct from classical logic. In section 2.5 I discuss
what this means for the problem of identifying a logic. In section 2.6 I consider whether this
logic is paraconsistent, and what this means for ST and other logics with similar consequence
relations. In section 2.7 I close with some concluding remarks.

2.2

Background

In this section I will introduce the logical framework that I’ll be using in the rest of the
paper. The formal system I present here requires a higher-order sequent calculus, in which
we can have sequents for which both the premises and conclusions are themselves sequents
of lower levels. Most of the notation used here comes from Scambler [36]. Most of the
technical machinery for the slice hierarchy comes from [2] and [28], although higher-order
sequent systems were earlier explored by Kosta Došen, for example in [11], [12], [13], and
[14]. However, I will be extending the hierarchy into the transfinite.3 The machinery for a
super/sub-valuationist mixed consequence relation comes from [10].

2.2.1

Languages

We define our set of languages inductively over the ordinals:
Base Case: Let L0 be a standard propositional language, with propositional constants
pi and the connectives ␣, ^, _.
3
Scambler [37] also extends the slice hierarchies into the transfinite, though his methods for doing so are
slightly different than mine. I suspect that the results using my transfinite framework carry over to his, and
vice-versa, but have not confirmed this.
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Successor Case: Given a language Lα for some ordinal α, let Lα`1 be the set of all pairs
of sets xΓ, ∆y such that Γ Y ∆ Ď Lα . I’ll write xΓ, ∆y in a sequent format, as Γ ñα`1 ∆.
We’ll call Γ ñα ∆ an “inference of order α” or an “α-inference”. So p ^ q ñ1 p is a 1inference, tp ñ1 p ^ qu ñ2 tñ1 qu is a 2-inference, and so on. I will omit set brackets when
no confusion can result.
Limit Case: Given languages Lβ for all β ă λ, let Lλ be the set of all pairs of sets xΓ, ∆y
Ť
such that Γ Y ∆ Ď βăλ Lβ . We’ll call Γ ñλ ∆ an “inference of order λ” or a “λ-inference”.
I will again will omit set brackets when no confusion can result.
Note that the limit-ordinal languages will be cumulative, in the terminology of [37]:
the sequents of limit-ordinal languages can contain inferences from any lower level. The
successor-ordinal languages, however, will not be cumulative in this sense: α ` 1-sequents
can only contain α-inferences.

2.2.2

Valuations and Models

Let a Boolean valuation be a function v : L0 Ñ t0, 1u such that the connectives ␣, ^, _
obey the truth tables of classical logic. The set of Boolean valuations is the set of models
for propositional classical logic. I’ll call propositional classical logic CL.
Let a supervaluation (SV) model be a nonempty set of Boolean valuations. I’ll use
V to denote the set of SV models. These models are based on the formal semantics for
supervaluationist and subvaluationist logics.4
4
For a general overview of supervaluationism, see [23]; for earlier presentations and defenses see [15], [24],
[27], and [38]; see [39] for a discussion of different consequence relations compatible with supervaluationist
semantics. For a general overview of subvaluationism, see [6]; for defenses and earlier presentations, see [7],
[20], [21], [22], and [40].
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Notions of Validity

We say a notion of α-validity is a function V : V ˆ Lα Ñ t0, 1u. We say a model m P V
satisfies an α-inference Γ ñα ∆ iff V pm, Γ ñα ∆q “ 1. We can think of a notion of 0-validity
as a notion of “truth-in-a-model” that determines which sentences get designated values at
each model. A notion of α ` 1-validity tells us which inferences between sets of α-inferences
are valid, and a notion of λ-inference for limit ordinal λ tells us which inferences between
sets of lower-level inferences are valid.
I will write V (m Γ ñα ∆ in place of V pm, Γ ñα ∆q “ 1, and V *m Γ ñα ∆ in place
of V pm, Γ ñα ∆q “ 0.
When no confusion can result, I will sometimes use Φ in place of Γ ñα ∆ for convenience.
When it is necessary to indicate that Φ is an α-inference for some ordinal α, I will write Φ
as Φα .
We say that an inference Φ is valid on a notion of α-validity iff for all m P V, V (m Φ.
We will write this as V ( Φ.
We say that an inference Φ is anti-valid on a notion of α-validity iff for all m P V,
V *m Φ. We will write this as V ) Φ.
In other words, an inference is valid iff no model is a counterexample; an inference is
antivalid if every model is a counterexample.
For all α and all Φ P Lα , we say that CL ( Φ whenever Φ is a valid α-inference in
classical logic CL.

2.2.4

Slice Hierarchies

BPS and Scambler use the following definition to produce logics of arbitrarily high (finite)
inference levels with notions of α-validity:
Definition 2.2.1. Successor Slice Let V and U be notions of α-validity. Then the slice
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of V and U , which we write as V {U , is the notion of α ` 1 validity such that for all m P V:
V {U (m Γ ñα`1 ∆ iff pDγ P ΓqV *m γ or pDδ P ∆qU (m δ.
We can extend this to the transfinite by adding the limit case:
Definition 2.2.2. Limit Slice: Let tVβ uβăλ and tUβ uβăλ be sets of notions of validity for
all β ă λ. Then the limit slice of tVβ uβăλ and tUβ uβăλ , which we write as Văλ {Uăλ is the
notion of λ-validity such that for all m P V: Văλ {Uăλ (m Γ ñλ ∆ iff either:
Dγ P Γ such that γ is a β-inference for some β ă λ and Vβ *m γ, or
Dδ P ∆ such that δ is a β-inference for some β ă λ and Uβ (m δ.
Given two notions of α-validity V and U , we can build the transfinite slice hierarchy over
V and U :
V, U
V {V , V {U , U {V , U {U
.
.
.
Using slices like the ones defined above, BPS show that one can use Strong Kleene 3valued models to build a slice hierarchy based on CERvR’s Strict-Tolerant logic ST. They
prove that for every inferential level n ă ω, there is a logic that has exactly the validities
of classical logic up to order n, but differs from classical logic at higher inferences levels.
They suggest that classical logic therefore must be identified by its valid inferences at every
(finite) inferential level. In [18], Fitting shows that this can be generalized beyond classical
logic. It therefore seems that no logic can be characterized by its valid inferences; we must
look at its valid metainferences at every metainferential level.
However, in [36] and [37], Scambler shows that even a logic with exactly the validities of
classical logic at every inferential level can differ from classical logic. He demonstrates that
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what he calls the “tolerant twist logic” has exactly the validities of classical logic at every
inferential level, but unlike classical logic, has no antivalidities. In [17] and [16], Fitting shows
that this too generalizes beyond classical logic. For any logic, we cannot characterize that
logic just by looking at the validities of every level. We must at least look at the validities
and antivalidities of every inferential level.
In what follows, I construct a transfinite slice hierarchy that gives us a logic with exactly
the validities of classical logic at every inferential level, and exactly the antivalidities of
classical logic at every inferential level. I will then argue that this logic still should not
be identified with classical logic, and that we therefore need a new criterion for identifying
logics.

2.2.5

A Note about Local and Global Validity

It is important to note that the definitions of successor and limit slices given above will
produce notions of local validity, rather than notions of global validity. When dealing with
metainferences, there are at least two ways to define metainferential validity over a class of
models: local validity and global validity.5
In traditional (unsliced) contexts, local validity can be thought of as preservation of satisfaction, while global validity can be thought of as preservation of validity. A metainference is
locally valid iff at every model, either some conclusion inference is satisfied or some premise
inference is not. A metainference is globally valid iff either some conclusion inference in valid
or some premise inference is valid. For example, the metainference tp ñ1 qu ñ2 tp ñ1 q ^ru
is globally valid in classical logic, because the premise inference p ñ1 q is not valid. But it
is not locally valid in classical logic, because there are classical valuations at which p ñ1 q
is satisfied but p ñ1 q ^ r is not. In general, local validity implies global validity, but global
validity does not imply local validity.
5

For a detailed discussion of the distinction between local and global metainferential validity, see [19].
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We can generalize these notions to slice notions of validity: an inference is V {U locally
valid iff at every model, either some premise is not V -satisfied or some conclusion is U satisfied. Similarly, an inference is V {U globally valid iff either some premise is not V -valid
or some conclusion is U -valid.
The notions of validity generated by the above definitions for successor and limit slices are
local, rather than global, notions of validity. Following [2], [28], and [36], I will be restricting
attention to local validity at each level, rather than global validity. I will therefore use
CL ( Φ whenever Φ is a locally valid inference in classical logic. There is a sense in which
local validity is more fine-grained than global validity: any two logics with the same locally
valid inferences must have the same globally valid inferences, but not vice-versa. ST and
classical logic have the same globally valid 2-inferences (in the empty signature), but have
different locally valid inferences: Cut is locally valid in classical logic, but is not locally valid
in ST (even in the empty signature). Therefore, when we see in the following sections that
the resulting logic has exactly the local validities of classical logic, it immediately follows
that it also has exactly the global validities of classical logic.

2.3
2.3.1

The LM Hierarchy
Two Notions of 0-validity

There are at least two interesting notions of 0-validity that can be defined over the set
of SV models V. These correspond to the notions of 0-validity for supervaluationism and
subvaluationism, so I’ll call them P (for suPervaluationism) and B (for suBvaluationism):
P (m ϕ iff vpϕq “ 1 for all v P m
B (m ϕ iff vpϕq “ 1 for some v P m
It is easy to see that for all 0-inferences, P ( ϕ iff B ( ϕ iff CL ( ϕ. If every Boolean
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valuation assigns 1 to ϕ, then every set of Boolean valuations contains only valuations that
assign 1 to ϕ. It is also easy to see that P ) ϕ iff B ) ϕ iff CL ) ϕ. If every Boolean
valuation assigns 0 to ϕ, then no set of Boolean valuations has any valuations that assign 1
to ϕ.

2.3.2

Six Notions of 1-validity

We could slice together P and B to form a hierarchy of notions of validity. For example,
there are four notions of 1-validity that we can get just by slicing P and B:
P {P (m Γ ñ1 ∆ iff either pDγ P ΓqpDv P mqvpγq “ 0 or pDδ P ∆qp@v P mqvpδq “ 1
B{B (m Γ ñ1 ∆ iff either pDγ P Γqp@v P mqvpγq “ 0 or pDδ P ∆qpDv P mqvpδq “ 1
B{P (m Γ ñ1 ∆ iff either pDγ P Γqp@v P mqvpγq “ 0 or pDδ P ∆qp@v P mqvpδq “ 1
P {B (m Γ ñ1 ∆ iff either pDγ P ΓqpDv P mqvpγq “ 0 or pDδ P ∆qpDv P mqvpδq “ 1
P {P and B{B correspond to the (global) 1-validity consequence relations for supervaluationism and subvaluationism, respectively. Neither has all of the 1-validities of classical
logic. For example, P {P * tu ñ1 A, ␣A, and B{B * A, ␣A ñ1 tu.
The mixed-condition 1-validity consequence relations B{P and P {B are effectively the
super/sub-valuation equivalents of the K3/LP consequence relations T S and ST .6 Like
T S, B{P is not reflexive, in the sense that A ñ1 A is not valid unless A is a classical
tautology or classical contradiction. Like ST , P {B has exactly the same valid 1-inferences
as classical logic. And like ST, there is a sense in which P/B is not transitive. In particular,
P {B (m Γ ñ1 A and P {B (m A ñ1 ∆ do not imply P {B (m Γ ñ1 ∆.7 Although
ST and P {B both have exactly the 1-validities of classical logic, P {B has an additional
6

For more information about the strict-tolerant approach in a super/sub-valuationist setting, see [10].
There are many different ways to use the term “transitive” when discussing consequence relations. See
[31] for a survey of several different notions. My use of the term is somewhat idiosyncratic, in that it is
really transitivity of satisfaction that I have in mind, rather than transitivity of validity. However, I take
this to be an important and distinctive feature of the logic: it means that the set of sentences that are true
in a model are not closed under the valid inferences of the logic. This has significant consequences for how
the logic handles non-logical axioms, which will be discussed more in sections 2.4 and 2.6.
7
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feature that ST does not have: P {B has all of the 1-validities of classical logic and all of the
1-antivalidities of classical logic.
B{P and P {B could be sliced together to construct a notion of 2-validity, which will
again have all of the 2-validities of classical logic. However, this notion of 2-validity will only
have some of the antivalidities of classical logic. For example, the 2-inference from A ñ1 A
to ñ1 A ^ ␣A is classically antivalid, but it is not antivalid in BP {P B: there are SV models
at which A ñ1 A is not B{P -satisfied. In order to construct a logic with all of validities
and all of the antivalidities of classical logic, we need to build our hierarchy using different
notions of 1-validity.
Instead of slicing together these two notions of 1-validity, we can define notions of 1validity directly, and build the hierarchy out of those. Our first such notion of 1-validity, L,
corresponds to what Williamson [41] calls the “local” consequence relation on supervaluation
models:
L (m Γ ñ1 ∆ iff p@v P mqrpDγ P Γqvpγq “ 0 _ pDδ P ∆qvpδq “ 1s
A 1-inference is L-satisfied at a model iff it is classically satisfied at every valuation in
the model. It’s easy to see that this notion of 1-validity has exactly the 1-validities and
1-antivalidities of classical logic.
In addition to L, we can also define a more tolerant consequence relation M :
M (m Γ ñ1 ∆ iff pDv P mqrpDγ P Γqvpγq “ 0 _ pDδ P ∆qvpδq “ 1s
A 1-inference is M -satisfied at a model iff it is classically satisfied at some valuation in the
model. M is, in fact, equivalent to P {B.8 Thus, like L, M has exactly the 1-validities and
1-antivalidities of classical logic. But despite this, M (or equivalently, P {B) is not transitive.
8
This is due to the fact that the existential quantifier distributes over disjunction in our classical metalanguage.
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To see this, let m be a model containing two valuations u and v, such that vppq “ 1, vpqq “ 0,
uppq “ 0, and upqq “ 0. In this case M (m ñ1 p and M (m p ñ1 q, and yet M *m ñ1 q.
There is one fact about L and M that will be important in constructing the LM hierarchy:
for any SV model m P V, L (m tu ñ1 ϕ iff P (m ϕ, and M ( tu ñ1 ϕ iff B ( ϕ. Without
this property, we couldn’t use these notions of 0- and 1-validity together to construct anything
that deserved to be called a “logic”.
It is easy to see, but important to note before we continue, that all six of these notions
of 1-validity have the following feature: given a singleton model tvu, each notion of validity
gives us (tvu Γ ñ1 ∆ iff CL (v Γ ñ1 ∆. Notions of α-validity at any level can have the
equivalent property for α-inferences. I will call this the singleton property:
Definition 2.3.1. Singleton Property
A notion of α-validity V has the singleton property if for all singleton models tvu and all
α-inferences Γ ñα ∆, V (tvu Γ ñα ∆ iff CL (v Γ ñα ∆.
Note that P and B, our notions of 0-validity, also have the singleton property. We can
now use P , B, L and M to construct a hierarchy of notions of validity that have all of the
validities and antivalidities of classical logic at every level of inference.

2.3.3

The Hierarchy

We will define what I will call the LM hierarchy inductively:
Base cases:
L0 = P, M0 = B
L1 = L, M1 = M
Successor Case: for α ě 1:
Lα`1 “ Mα {Lα , Mα`1 “ Lα {Mα
Limit Case: for limit ordinals λ:
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Lλ “ Măλ {Lăλ , Mλ “ Lăλ {Măλ
Call M8 the logic that evaluates α-validity at every ordinal α in accordance with Mα .
Similarly for L8 .
My primary goal in this section will be to show that M8 has exactly the validities and
antivalidities of classical logic at every inference level. First, we need to show that every
notion of validity in the hierarchy has the singleton property:
Lemma 1. If two notions of α-validity Xα and Yα both have the singleton property, then
their slice Xα {Yα also has the singleton property.
Proof. CL (v Γ ñα`1 ∆ iff either there is a γ P Γ such that CL *v γ, or there is a
δ P ∆ such that CL (v δ. Since Xα and Yα both have the singleton property, CL *v γ
iff Xα *tvu γ and CL (v δ iff Yα (tvu δ. Xα {Yα (tvu Γ ñα`1 ∆ iff there is a γ P Γ such
that Xα *tvu γ or there is a δ P ∆ such that Yα (tvu δ. Therefore CL (v Γ ñα`1 ∆ iff
Xα {Yα (tvu Γ ñα`1 ∆.
This also holds for the limit slices:
Lemma 2. If every notion of validity Xi P tXβ uβăλ and Yi P tYβ uβăλ has the singleton
property, then Xăλ {Yăλ has the singleton property.
Proof. Suppose CL (v Γ ñλ ∆. Then either CL *v γ for some γ P Γ, or CL (v δ for
some δ P ∆. By IH, for all β ă λ, Xβ (tvu Φβ iff CL (v Φβ , and Yβ (tvu Φβ iff CL (v Φβ .
If CL *v γβ for some γ P Γ and β ă λ, then Xβ *tvu γβ , and so Xăλ {Yăλ (tvu Γ ñλ ∆.
Otherwise, CL (v δβ for some δ P ∆ and some β ă λ. Then Yβ (tvu δβ , and so Xăλ {Yăλ (tvu
Γ ñλ ∆.
The reverse direction follows the same pattern.
It follows that if two notions of validity V and U have the singleton property, then every
notion of validity in the transfinite hierarchy over V and U has the singleton property. Since
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P , B, L, and M all have the singleton property, this means that every notion of validity in
M8 and in L8 has the singleton property. We can use this fact to prove sufficient conditions
for a slice notion of α ` 1-validity to have all of the validities and all of the antivalidities of
classical logic.
Lemma 3. Let Xα and Yα be two notions of α-validity defined over the set of SV models
V that both have the singleton property. Suppose that for all SV models m, Xα (m Φ
implies CL (v Φ for all v P m, and Yα *m Φ implies CL *v Φ for all v P m. Then
Xα {Yα ( Γ ñα`1 ∆ iff CL ( Γ ñα`1 ∆.
Proof. The left-to-right direction follows from lemma 1. Since Xα and Yα both have the
singleton property, Xα {Yα does too. So CL * Φ implies that Xα {Yα * Φ: if some valuation
v is a CL counterexample to Φ, then tvu will be a Xα {Yα counterexample to Φ.
For the right-to-left direction, suppose Xα {Yα * Γ ñα`1 ∆. Then there is an SV model
m P V such that Xα {Yα *m Γ ñα`1 ∆. It follows that Xα (m γ for all γ P Γ and Yα *m δ
for all δ P ∆. By assumption, Xα (m Φ implies CL (v Φ for all v P m, and Yα *m Φ implies
CL *v Φ for all v P m. Therefore every v P m is such that CL (v γ for all γ and CL *v δ
for all δ P ∆. Therefore CL * Γ ñα`1 ∆.
Lemma 4. Let Xα and Yα be two notions of α-validity defined over the set of SV models
V that both have the singleton property. Suppose that for all SV models m P V, CL (v Φ
for all v P m implies Xα (m Φ, and CL *v Φ for all v P m implies Yα *m Φ. Then
Xα {Yα ) Γ ñα`1 ∆ iff CL ) Γ ñα`1 ∆.
Proof. The left-to-right direction follows from lemma 1. Since Xα and Yα both have the
singleton property, Xα {Yα does too. So CL + Φ implies that Xα {Yα + Φ: if some valuation
v is not a CL counterexample to Φ, then tvu will not be a Xα {Yα counterexample to Φ.
For the right-to-left direction, suppose CL ) Γ ñα`1 ∆. Then for every Boolean valuation v, CL (v γ for all γ P Γ and CL * δ for all δ P ∆. By assumption, CL (v Φ for all
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v P m implies Xα (m Φ, and CL *v Φ for all v P m implies Yα *m Φ. It follows that for
every SV model m P V, Xα (m Φ and Yα *m Φ. Therefore, Xα {Yα ) Γ ñα`1 ∆.
These conditions also hold for the limit slices:
Lemma 5. Let tXβ uβăλ and tYβ uβăλ be two sets of notions of β-validity defined over the
set of SV models V for all β ă λ that all have the singleton property. Suppose that for all
β ă λ and all SV models m P V, Xβ (m Φ implies CL (v Φ for all v P m, and Yβ *m Φ
implies CL *v Φ for all v P m. Then Xăλ {Yăλ ( Γ ñλ ∆ iff CL ( Γ ñλ ∆.
Proof. The left-to-right direction follows from the singleton property.
For the right-to-left direction, suppose that Xăλ {Yăλ * Γ ñλ ∆. Then there is an SV
model m P V such that for all γ P Γ and all δ P ∆ and all β ă λ, Xβ (m γβ and Yβ *m δβ .
It follows that for all v P m, CL (v γ and CL *v δ for all γ P Γ and δ P ∆. Therefore,
CL * Γ ñλ ∆.
Lemma 6. Let tXβ uβăλ and tYβ uβăλ be two sets of notions of β-validity defined over the set
of SV models V for all β ă λ that all have the singleton property. Suppose that for all β ă λ,
all β-inferences Φ, and all SV models m P V, CL (v Φ for all v P m implies Xβ (m Φ, and
CL *v Φ for all v P m implies Yβ *m Φ. Then Xăλ {Yăλ ) Γ ñλ ∆ iff CL ) Γ ñλ ∆.
Proof. The left-to-right direction follows from the singleton property.
For the right-to-left direction, suppose that CL ) Γ ñλ ∆. Then for every Boolean
valuation v, CL (v γ for all γ P Γ, and CL *v δ for all δ P ∆. By assumption, CL (v Φβ
for all v P m implies Xβ (m Φβ , and CL *v Φβ for all v P m implies Yβ *m Φβ . It follows
that for all SV models m P V, Xβ (m γβ and Yβ *m δβ . Therefore Xăλ {Yăλ ) Γ ñλ ∆.
So to show that the logic M8 has all of the validities and antivalidities of classical logic
at every inferential level, it suffices to show that for all ordinals α ě 1 and all SV models
m P V, Lα (m Φ iff CL (v Φ for all v P m, and Mα *m Φ iff CL (v Φ for all v P m.
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Lemma 7. For all α ě 1, Lα (m Φ iff CL (v Φ for all v P m, and Mα *m Φ iff CL *v Φ
for all v P m.
Proof. By induction. The base case is L and M , and follows immediately from the definition
of L and M .
For the successor case, we take the inductive hypothesis that for all SV models m P V
and all Φ P Lα , Lα (m Φ iff CL (v Φ for all v P m and Mα *m Φ iff CL *v Φ for all v P m.
For Lα`1 , we note that Lα`1 (m Γ ñα`1 ∆ iff either pDγ P ΓqMα *m γ or pDδ P ∆qLα (m
δ. By IH, for all γ P Γ and all δ P ∆, Mα *m γ iff CL *v γ for all v P m, and Lα (m δ iff
CL (v δ for all v P m. By definition, pDγ P ΓqCL *v γ for all v P m or pDδ P ∆qCL (v δ for
all v P m iff CL (v Γ ñα`1 ∆ for all v P m.
For Mα`1 , we note that Mα`1 *m Γ ñα`1 ∆ iff p@γ P ΓqLα (m γ and p@δ P ∆qMα *m δ.
By IH, for all γ P Γ and all δ P ∆, Lα (m γ iff CL (v γ for all v P m, and Mα *m δ iff
CL *v δ for all v P m. By definition, CL (v γ for all v P m and CL *v δ for all v P m iff
CL * Γ ñα`1 ∆ for all v P m.
For the limit case, we take the inductive hypothesis that for all β ă λ, for all SV models
Ť
m P V and for all Φ P βăλ Lβ , Lβ (m Φ iff CL (v Φ for all v P m and Mβ *m Φ iff
CL *v Φ for all v P m.
For Lλ , we note that Lλ (m Γ ñλ ∆ iff either pDγ P ΓqpDβ ă λqMβ *m γ or pDδ P
∆qpDβ ă λqLβ (m δ. By IH, for all γ P Γ and all δ P ∆ and all β ă λ, Mβ *m γβ
iff CL *v γβ for all v P m, and Lβ (m δβ iff CL (v δβ for all v P m. By definition,
pDγ P ΓqCL *v γ for all v P m or pDδ P ∆qCL (v δ for all v P m iff CL (v Γ ñλ ∆ for all
v P m.
For Mλ , we note that Mλ *m Γ ñλ ∆ iff p@γ P ΓqpDβ ă λqLβ (m γ and p@δ P ∆qpDβ ă
λqMβ *m δ. By IH, for all γ P Γ and all δ P ∆ and all β ă λ, Lβ (m γβ iff CL (v γβ for all
v P m, and Mβ *m δβ iff CL *v δβ for all v P m. By definition, CL (v γ for all v P m and
CL *v δ for all v P m iff CL *v Γ ñλ ∆ for all v P m.
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With this, we can now prove the primary result of this section:
Theorem 8. For every ordinal α, M8 ( Φα iff CL ( Φα , and M8 ) Φα iff CL ) Φα .
Proof. Follows immediately from lemmas 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and the fact that B has exactly
the 0-validities and 0-antivalidities of classical logic and M has exactly the 1-validities and
1-antivalidities of classical logic.
M8 therefore has exactly the validities and antivalidities of classical logic at every inferential level.

2.4

Is M8 Classical Logic?

We have just shown that the logic M8 has exactly the validities and antivalidities of classical
logic at every inferential level. One might therefore be tempted to identify M8 with classical
logic. However, this would be a mistake.
To illustrate why, we need to look at how the two logics handle the addition of non-logical
axioms. When presented with the same set of axioms in the same language, M8 and classical
logic will generate different theories, at least in some cases. I take this to be a reason for
thinking that the two logics are distinct.
We often want to use a logic to prove theorems from sets of axioms, as in the case of
ZFC or Peano Arithmetic. This does not involve moving to a new logic; a single logic, like
classical logic, can be used with a variety of theory-specific non-logical axioms and still be
the same logic in each case. Any set of axioms will have certain consequences in a logic.
Given a logic L and a set of axioms Γ, let the theory of Γ in L be the set of formulae that
are true (satisfied) at all L-models at which the members of Γ are true (satisfied).9
9

Although “theory” is defined here semantically, this definition is equivalent to the proof-theoretic notion
of a theory as the set of formulae provable from a set of axioms. I use the semantic definition here for the
simple reason that I do not currently have a proof theory for the model-theoretically-defined logic M8 .
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Suppose that we are presented with two logics, L and L1 . Suppose that, given the same
language L and the same set of non-logical axioms Γ, the theory generated by Γ in L is
strictly greater than the theory generated by Γ in L1 . In that case, I take it that L and L1
can safely be considered different logics. What follows from a given set of axioms does not
and should not depend on how the logic is presented. It would be quite a shock to discover
that whether or not the continuum hypothesis follows from ZFC depends on how we present
first order classical logic: in one presentation, the continuum hypothesis is independent of
the axioms of ZFC, but in another presentation it is a theorem. That simply cannot happen;
there must be some determinate, presentation-independent fact of the matter as to what
the consequences of such-and-such axioms are in a given logic. What follows from a set of
axioms in a logic is not a matter of presentation; it is an essential feature of the logic.
With that in mind, let’s consider how classical logic and M8 behave given the same set
of axioms in the same language. In the standard propositional language used in the previous
section, take p1 and ␣p1 as axioms in both classical logic and M8 . In the sequent calculus
presentation that we’ve been using, one way to do this is to add tñ1 p1 , ñ1 ␣p1 u as a set
of axioms in our formal system.10 We can then examine the theory of tñ1 p1 , ñ1 ␣p1 u in
each logic.11
The theory generated by these axioms in classical logic is trivial. Every sequent whatsoever follows from tñ1 p1 , ñ1 ␣p1 u in classical logic, including ñ1 A for all formulae A. In
classical logic, there is no way for ñ1 p1 and ñ1 ␣p1 to be satisfied at the same valuation;
the two inferences are not jointly satisfiable. Therefore it is trivially true that A is true in
all models in which p1 and ␣p1 are true, and so any sentence A is a member of the theory
10

In doing so, we need not take ñ1 p1 to be logically valid. We can take ñ1 p1 as an axiom simply as a
way to restrict to models that satisfy p1 . We can do this because in both M8 and classical logic, a model is
a counterexample to a formula A iff it is a counterexample to ñ1 A iff it is a counterexample to ñ2 ñ1 A,
and so on.
11
I take this to be one way of adding axioms to a sequent calculus system, but it is not the only way. For
my purposes, it is enough that this is one potentially useful way of adding non-logical axioms to the system,
which we may want to use for some kinds of axioms.
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of p1 and ␣p1 in classical logic.
However, this is not the case in M8 . To see why, note that both ñ1 p1 and ñ1 ␣p1
will be satisfied at any SV model in which at least one Boolean valuation assigns p1 value 1,
and at least one valuation assigns p1 value 0. Such models need not be trivial in M8 ; any
set of two Boolean valuations assigning different values to p1 will do. ñ1 p1 and ñ1 ␣p1
are therefore jointly satisfiable in M8 : there are models that satisfy both inferences. This
means that the question of which formulae and inferences are satisfied at the models of
tñ1 p1 , ñ1 ␣p1 u is not at all trivial. For some models m and some formulae A, there will
be no valuation in m that assigns value 1 to A. For example, there is no Boolean valuation
that assigns value 1 to p1 ^ ␣p1 . As a result, ñ1 p1 ^ ␣p1 is antivalid in M8 : there is no
model that satisfies ñ1 p1 ^ ␣p1 . This is true even if we restrict our attention to models
that satisfy both ñ1 p1 and ñ1 ␣p1 . Therefore ñ1 p1 ^ ␣p1 is not in the theory of ñ1 p1
and ñ1 ␣p1 in M8 (even though tñ1 p1 , ñ1 ␣p1 u ñ2 tñ1 p1 ^ ␣p1 u is valid). But it is in
the theory of those axioms in classical logic; everything is. As such, the same axioms in the
same language can have different theories in M8 than in classical logic. M8 and classical
logic are therefore distinct logics.

2.5

Identity Conditions for Logics

I’ve argued that classical logic and M8 are not the same logic, despite the fact that they
have the same validities and antivalidities at every inferential level. We might then ask,
under what conditions can logics L and L1 rightfully be said to be the same logic?
Together with the results of [2] and [36], I take the results here to show that having
the same validities and antivalidities is not sufficient to identify two formal systems as the
same logic, even if they have the same validities and antivalidities at every inferential level.
M8 and classical logic have exactly the same validities and antivalidities at every inferential
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level, and yet they can behave quite differently when given the same set of axioms. But
the consequences of a set of axioms are not presentation-dependent features of a logic; the
same axioms should not generate different theories depending on how we present the logic.
M8 and classical logic must therefore be distinct logics, and so it is possible for two distinct
logics to have all the same validities and antivalidities at every level of inference.
We must look beyond validities and antivalidities in order to determine whether two
formal systems L and L1 are distinct logics, or are simply two presentations of the same
logic. In light of the discussion in the previous section, I propose that we at least need to
consider the sets of inferences that are jointly satisfiable in a given logic. Even if two logics
agree on which inferences have counterexamples and non-counterexamples, the logics can
still disagree regarding which sets of inferences share a single counterexample and which do
not. In classical logic, the 1-inferences ñ1 A and ñ1 ␣A are not jointly satisfiable. In M8 ,
they are. This seems to be precisely the reason that classical logic and M8 behave differently
given p1 and ␣p1 as axioms: the axioms are jointly satisfiable in M8 , but are not jointly
satisfiable in classical logic. Having the same sets of jointly satisfiable inferences therefore
seems promising as an identity condition to distinguish logics.
In fact if we take sets of jointly satisfiable inferences as an identity condition, then the
antivalidities condition can be dropped. It is subsumed under the jointly satisfiable sets
condition: if two logics have exactly the same sets of jointly satisfiable inferences, then they
must also have the same antivalidities. This is because the α-inference Φ is antivalid iff Φ is
not satisfiable iff the singleton set of inferences tΦu is not jointly satisfiable.12 However, the
validities and jointly satisfiable sets conditions are independent. To see why, consider the
12

Sets of inferences that are not jointly satisfiable therefore generalize the notion of antivalid inference: they
are, in effect, the sets of inferences that are together antivalid. We could apply an analogous generalization
to validity, and look at the sets of inferences that do not share a single counterexample. L, the local
supervaluationist consequence relation, for example, has exactly the same valid 1-inferences as classical
logic, but has different sets of 1-inferences that do not share a counterexample: ñ1 A and ñ1 ␣A cannot
share a counterexample in classical logic, but they can in the local supervaluationist logic. Whether or not
this generalization has any philosophically interesting applications remains to be seen.
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trivial logic in which every inference is valid. In this logic, every set of inferences is jointly
satisfiable. In at least some languages, every set of 1-inferences is jointly satisfiable in the
strict-tolerant logic ST. This is because (without logical constants and the like) ST has a
model in which every formula gets value 12 , and every 1-inference is satisfied at that model.
So ST and the trivial logic have exactly the same sets of jointly satisfiable inferences, yet
they have different validities: some inferences are invalid in ST, but no inferences are invalid
in the trivial logic. The same-validities condition therefore cannot be subsumed under the
same-sets-of-jointly-satisfiable-inferences condition. Joint satisfiability is a matter of there
being a non-counterexample, and the existence of non-counterexamples cannot by itself tell
us whether there are no counterexamples.
It is worth noting that the new identity condition offered here is a semantic condition.
Unlike validity (and possibly antivalidity), “sets of jointly satisfiable inferences” is an inherently semantic notion, defined in terms of models and satisfaction conditions. Some,
especially those who take a purely instrumentalist approach to the models for a logic, may
object to this as an identity condition on logics.13
However, the identity condition offered here is a semantic condition in part because, like
the slice-hierarchy logics that came before it, M8 is constructed model-theoretically. As
such, its consequence relation is defined semantically. There may be proof theoretic ways
to formulate these logics without appealing to any model-theoretic definitions. Once this
is done, it will hopefully be clear what the proof-theoretic equivalent of jointly satisfiable
inferences might be; it may be some sort of closure operator on sets of non-logical axioms.
By introducing this semantic identity condition, I do not mean to suggest that there is no
equivalent proof-theoretic condition that could serve the same purpose. There may well
be a way to distinguish M8 from classical logic without making any appeal to models or
satisfaction conditions. The important point is that, whatever that equivalent proof-theoretic
13

Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
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condition might be, it will have to be go beyond valid and antivalid inferences.
It is also worth noting that sets of jointly satisfiable inferences, as an identity condition
on logics, is more fine-grained than the usual properties used to identify logics, like the set
of valid inferences or a counterexample relation.14 One lesson we can learn from comparing
M8 and classical logic (or comparing ST8 and classical logic) is that the valid and antivalid
inferences of a logic do not by themselves tell us what consequences a set of axioms will have
in the logic. M8 and classical logic have exactly the same valid inferences, yet in some cases
they will give us different consequences for the same set of axioms in the same language.
If we were to look only at validities, or only at validities and antivalidities, then we
would not have enough information to determine what we could or could not prove in the
logic from non-logical axioms. So in order to understand how the logic behaves and what
is or isn’t provable in the logic, we need to look to more fine-grained details of the logic
beyond just which inferences are valid. Valid inferences alone are too coarse-grained to tell
us what follows from a set of axioms in the logic, and are therefore too coarse-grained to tell
us whether or not two formal systems are in fact the same logic. As such, we need to look
to more fine-grained distinctions in order to determine whether two formal systems will give
us the same consequences for the same set of axioms.

2.6

Paraconsistency and Nontransitive Consequence Relations

2.6.1

Is M8 Paraconsistent?

In [36], Scambler argues that the hierarchy logic based on ST introduced in [2] and [28] as a
fully classical logic, which I will call ST8 , is not in fact classical logic. He argues that, unlike
14

Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
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classical logic, ST8 is really a paraconsistent logic: “In the case of [ST8 ], we have not really
gotten rid of paraconsistency: we have merely thoroughly repressed it, so that it does not
affect validity at any orders. Nevertheless, it is still present: there are valuations on which
p ^ ␣p comes out valid” [36].
I take Scambler’s point here to be something like the following: when we discuss paraconsistency, we often discuss it in terms of the validity or invalidity of the various rules of
Explosion, like A, ␣A ñ1 B and A ^ ␣A ñ1 B. However, in these discussions, we are
not interested in the validity of these schema for their own sake. Part of our interest in
the validity or invalidity in these schema is that we take them to give us information as to
whether or not the logical system can tolerate inconsistency. But ST8 and M8 can tolerate
inconsistencies in their models: both logics have models at which both ñ1 A and ñ1 ␣A
are satisfied. This, Scambler suggests, means that they are really paraconsistent logics.
Normally, a logic is called “paraconsistent” only if some version of Explosion (usually
A, ␣A ñ1 B or A ^ ␣A ñ1 B) is invalid in that logic. But ST8 and M8 validate every
rule of Explosion that classical logic validates, including the metainferential Explosion rule
discussed in [3]. As such, ST8 and M8 are neither strongly nor weakly paraconsistent, in
Hyde’s terminology [21], [20].15 So any by the usual definitions of “paraconsistent”, ST8
and M8 simply are not paraconsistent.
However, per Scambler’s point, ST8 and M8 certainly have some paraconsistent-ish
features. Both logics have models at which both ñ1 A and ñ1 ␣A are satisfied.16 As a
result, the logics can tolerate inconsistent axioms in a way that classical logic cannot. In
classical logic, theories are closed under Explosion, in the following sense: if A, ␣A P T for
theory T , then B P T . Although Explosion is valid in ST8 and M8 , theories are not closed
15

Hyde credits this distinction to Arruda [1]. Equivalently, we could say in Ripley’s terminology that the
two logics are neither conjunctively nor collectively paraconsistent [32].
16
It is worth noting that, although M8 has no models at which both A and ␣A get value 0, L8 does.
L8 is therefore in a similar situation: it validates the Law of Excluded Middle, yet has models that satisfy
neither ñ1 A nor ñ1 ␣A.
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under Explosion in these logics: there are theories containing A and ␣A but not B, for some
sentences A and B. So although ST8 and M8 are not paraconsistent by the usual definitions
of paraconsistency, they should be considered at least psuedo-paraconsistent logics.

2.6.2

Scambler’s Tortoise Objection to ST8 and M8

Scambler argues that this paraconsistency (or pseudo-paraconsistency) shows that ST8 (and
by analogy, M8 ) cannot really be considered a presentation of classical logic. On this point,
Scambler and I are in agreement. But Scambler further argues that there is something
wrong with these logics. He argues that hierarchy logics like ST8 are not “closed under their
own laws” in an important sense, and that this raises potential problems not just for any
proponents of these logics, but for proponents of ST and similar logics as well.
Scambler [36] compares ST8 to Lewis Carroll’s Tortoise [5]. The Tortoise accepts A, and
B, and accepts C := “if A and B are true, Z must be true” but still does not accept Z. The
Tortoise continues to accept statements of the form “if A and B and C and... are true, then
Z must be true”, but the Tortoise still refuses to accept Z.
I take the primary lesson of Carroll’s paper to be that accepting or endorsing the statement of a rule is very different from actually obeying a rule. Asserting that an inference is
valid is not the same thing as actually making that inference. Scambler’s objection to ST8 ,
and by extension to M8 , is that these logics in effect “accept” classical inferences as valid,
without in fact allowing us to make those inferences.
Scambler illustrates this issue by introducing a liar constant to the language, but we can
make the same point without moving to a new language by looking at inconsistent axioms.
ST8 and M8 both validate the Explosion Rule A, ␣A ñ1 B, as well as the Metainferential
Explosion Rule tñ1 A, ñ1 ␣Au ñ2 tñ1 Bu. However, if we take A and ␣A to be axioms (or
ñ1 A and ñ1 ␣A, in our sequent calculus presentation), we see that the theory generated
by these axioms is not closed under explosion. M8 , for example, has models in which ñ1 A
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and ñ1 ␣A are satisfied, but ñ1 B is not. The theory generated by these axioms in M8
therefore does not contain every sentence B whatsoever.
Scambler says that ST8 is not “closed under its own laws”. For our purposes, we might
instead say that theories in ST8 and M8 are not closed under valid inferences. The end
result, however, is the same: the valid inferences of these logics do not necessarily correspond
to rules of inference that we can use when proving theorems from non-logical axioms. Like
Carroll’s Tortoise, these logics accept the Explosion Rule, but do not allow us to infer
according to the Explosion Rule.
Scambler [36] suggests that this poses a potential problem for these logics. ST8 and M8
seem to make precisely the same move that the Tortoise makes: endorsing rules that one
does not follow. Defenders of these logics would therefore seem to be endorsing inferences
without actually making those inferences. But then it is not clear exactly why one would
want a logic that validates rules of inference that one cannot use. This certainly does appear
to be a problem for these logics. Any defenders of ST8 and M8 would have to explain what
purpose validating rules of inference that we cannot use might have.

2.6.3

The case of ST

Scambler argues that this is not just a problem for hierarchy logics like ST8 and M8 ; he
argues that it also poses a problem for ST. ST has a nontransitive consequence relation for
1-inferences, but transitive consequence relations for every higher level of inference.17 As
Scambler puts it, “If the problem [with logics like ST8 and M8 ] is (as I suggested) that the
logic is not closed under its own laws, then why isn’t the fact that logics like [ST] also aren’t
closed under their laws similarly problematic? Don’t we have essentially the same structure
in each case?” [36].
Scambler’s objection, I take it, is this: if nontransitive consequence relations are simply
17

Recall that by “transitive”, I mean that (m Γ ñ1 A and (m A ñ1 ∆ imply (m Γ ñ ∆.
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endorsing rules that they don’t obey, then this seems like it will be a problem at any level.
The defenders of ST, who endorse a nontransitive consequence relation at the level of 1inferences, therefore have to explain why they are in any better position than Carroll’s
Tortoise, or the hierarchy logics that have nontransitive consequence relations at every level.
I agree with Scambler that the full hierarchy logics like ST8 and M8 seem to face a
serious problem that defenders of those logics would have to address. But I do not think
that this is necessarily a problem for defenders of ST.
In the case of ST, this is potentially a serious problem if we want to use the 1-inferences
of ST to reason normally. Because ST holds premises to a different standard than it holds
conclusions, valid 1-inferences do not preserve any nice properties like truth in a model (i.e.
0-inference satisfaction). In particular, this means that the theory of a set of axioms is not
necessarily closed under the valid 1-inferences in ST.18 The 1-inference A, ␣A ñ1 B is valid
in ST, yet there are models of ST in which both A and ␣A are satisfied 0-inferences but B
is not. So if we try to use the valid 1-inferences of ST as rules of inference applied to axioms,
we will end up “proving” sentences that do not actually follow from those axioms in ST.
As I said, this is potentially a serious problem for ST. However, this is not a problem
if we want to use ST in a different way. For example, Ripley [33] presents a bilateralist
interpretation of ST, according to which validity is understood in terms of assertion and
denial.19 On Ripley’s bilateralist interpretation of ST, a 1-inference Γ ñ1 ∆ is valid iff the
“position” of asserting all of the γs and denying all of the δs is incoherent. So according to
Ripley, “Γ ñ1 ∆ can now be read as the claim that the position [of asserting the γs and
denying the δs] is out of bounds.” (emphasis mine; notation slightly altered) [33].
18
Valid 1-inferences in ST do have the disjunctive property of either preserving what we might call “tolerant
truth” (having value 1 or 12 ) from left to right or preserving “tolerant untruth” (having value 0) from right
to left. Unfortunately, this does not suffice to close theories under the valid 1-inferences. This is in part
because the validity of an inference does not by itself tell us which property is preserved by that inference.
As a result, neither property is preserved in all cases. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this
issue.
19
For earlier defenses of bilateralism independent of ST, see [35] and [30].
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Thus on the bilateralist interpretation of ST, valid 1-inferences need not be understood
as representing rules of inference that are safe to use. Rather, they should be understood as
claims about what is impermissible to assert and deny. ST is then not a tool for reasoning
about sentences, but a tool for reasoning about positions. On this interpretation, the 1inferences are the claims about which we are making inferences; they do not themselves
correspond to rules that we use to make inference.
In some sense, this means that the 1-inferences of ST cannot be used in the way that we
usually use inferences. But ST is still a perfectly usable logic for reasoning about positions,
because the valid 2-inferences preserve 1-inference validity. Furthermore, the theory generated by any set of 1-inferences that we take as axioms will be closed under the (locally) valid
2-inferences of ST. If we take a set of 1-inferences as axioms, we can therefore use (locally)
valid 2-inferences as rules of inference.
This interpretation of ST therefore avoids Scambler’s objection, because it does not
endorse rules that it refuses to obey. It obeys the 2-inference rules that it endorses, and it
does not consider valid 1-inferences to be rules at all.20
However, this same approach will not work for ST8 or M8 . It is crucial to the bilateralist
account of ST that we can understand metainferences in the usual way: as formal representations of rules of inference that we can use. Without that, it’s not clear how we could
use the logic as a logic. But ST8 and M8 have nontransitive consequence relations at every
level of inference. As a result, there is no level of inference at which the valid inferences can
be understood as rules of inference: there is no ordinal α at which theories are closed under
all valid α-inferences. The bilateralist interpretation of ST reinterprets valid inferences at
one level as claims instead of rules, but we can still use the valid inferences of the next level
as rules of inference. In ST8 and M8 , every level has to be reinterpreted. This leaves no
20

This is not to say that the bilateralist interpretation is free from objections; only that it is free from this
particular objection.
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level at which valid inferences can be understood as rules of inference that it is safe to use.
It’s therefore not clear how we are to use these logics, if we are to use them.
There may be uses for such logics; I leave open the question of whether or not formal
systems like M8 can serve useful purposes. There are many ways to use a formal construction.
For example, in this paper I have used M8 as an example in an argument for certain claims
about identity criteria for logics. But in doing so, I wasn’t really using M8 as a logic. To
use a logic as a logic, “from the inside” so to speak, we need to be able to use the formal
construction as a tool for making inferences. I take Scambler’s objection to hierarchy logics
like ST8 and M8 to be that, due to the non-transitive nature of the logics, they cannot
really be used as logics in this sense. In that, I agree.
That is not to say that these logics cannot be useful; there may be many purposes for
which we could use them. But they cannot be used in what we might call the “usual way”.
There are important uses of a logic for which hierarchy logics simply will not work. What
other purposes these logics might serve depends in part on how these logics can be usefully
interpreted. At the moment, it is not clear how this is to be done. And this does indeed
present a problem for any defenders of these logics.

2.7

Conclusion

I’ve argued that a logic cannot be identified by its valid and antivalid inferences, even at
every inferential level. At a minimum, we suggest that we must also look to which sets of
inferences are jointly satisfiable. Ultimately, we need to look to the rules of inference that
the logic allows us to use. Two logics having exactly the same validities and antivalidities
does not suffice to guarantee that the two logics obey the same rules of inference, or that
they will allow us to prove the same consequences from the same set of axioms.
I take it that when we attempt to characterize logics and logical properties by the validity
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or invalidity of inferences, we often do so because we make certain assumptions about what
those inferences represent. The recent development of mixed-condition consequence relations
has demonstrated that these assumptions can be broken. In particular, the valid inferences of
a logic can come apart from the rules of inference that the logic allows us to use. This means
that instead of looking only at the inferences of a logic, we should be looking directly at the
properties and rules of inference that the logic allows. Although inferences can represent
these properties and rules in some settings, I take the results here and in [2] and [36] to show
that inferences do not always do so.21

21

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Buenos Aires Logic Group WIP Seminar, and at
a workshop on substructural logics and hierarchies thereof hosted by the CUNY Logic and Metaphysics
Workshop and the Saul Kripke Center. I am grateful to the audiences of these talks for their feedback. I am
indebted to Eduardo Barrio, Paul Egré, Federico Pailos, Graham Priest, David Ripley, and Chris Scambler
for many helpful discussions of these ideas and for all of their feedback on earlier drafts of the paper. Many
thanks also to the two anonymous referees, whose helpful comments improved the paper significantly.
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Introduction

In recent years, substructural logics have been presented as potential solutions to the semantic paradoxes. These proposed solutions avoid the paradoxes by giving up one of the
standard structural rules, either Cut or Contraction. Nontransitive approaches give up Cut
in order to tolerate the inconsistencies that arise in a naive theory of truth without triviality.1 Noncontractive logics give up Contraction in order to avoid inconsistencies in the
first place. Both sorts of substructural systems can provide a naive theory of truth without
triviality. These substructural approaches aim to provide a uniform solution to the semantic
paradoxes, in which every paradoxical argument is blocked at the exact same step: either
an application of Cut, or an application of Contraction.
If these substructural approaches are going to provide a uniform solution to semantic
paradoxes, then these substructural logics need to provide logics that we can use in the way
that we usually use logics. One important use of a logic is to discover the consequences
of a set of axioms, premises, or assumptions. For example, in mathematics we are often
interested in the consequences of ZFC. In philosophy, we are interested in the consequences
of particular theories of truth, or knowledge, or ethics. In these cases, we want to know
what our assumptions or axioms make true, or what we are obligated to accept given that
we accept those assumptions. Crucially, the collections of axioms in which we are interested
are often infinite: we will never use all of the axioms in any single proof, but we want to use
our logic to discover the consequences of this infinite collection of axioms.
I have argued elsewhere, in “Supervaluations and the Strict-Tolerant Hierarchy”, that
at least some nontransitive approaches cannot be used for this purpose. Specifically, I have
argued that any logic that goes nontransitive “all the way” through the infinite hierarchy of
metainferences cannot be used to discover the consequences of a set of nonlogical axioms.
1

For example: the nontransitive logic ST T validates $ L ^ ␣L—where L is the liar sentence— and also
validates L ^ ␣L $ B. But without Cut, this does not imply $ B, and thus triviality is avoided.
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In this paper, I argue that noncontractive approaches fare no better. In section 3.2, I
discuss noncontractive logics, and some examples of the noncontractive approach. In section
3.3, I present paradoxes involving an infinitary conjunction, which cannot be avoided by
dropping the structural rule of Contraction. In section 3.4, I present a version of the validity
curry paradox that involves countably infinitely many premises. In section 3.5, I present a
version of the validity curry paradox for what Mares and Paoli [10] call “external validity”.
In section 3.6, consider a possible response on behalf of the the noncontractive approach,
and argue that it does not avoid paradox. In section 3.7, I argue that these failures are
part of a general problem that noncontractive approaches have with closure. I consider a
recent proposal that aims to solve this problem, and argue that it fails. In section 3.8, I
conclude that the noncontractive approach does not provide a uniform solution to semantic
paradoxes. There are contexts in which we need a logic to discover the consequences of
nonlogical axioms, and for those contexts the noncontractive approach tells us nothing; it
merely changes the subject.

3.2

Noncontractive Logics

A noncontractive logic is a logic in which the structural rules of Contraction, W L and W R:
Γ, A, A $ ∆
WL
Γ, A $ ∆
Γ $ B, B, ∆
WR
Γ $ B, ∆
This rule is used, explicitly or implicitly, in the derivation of virtually every semantic
paradox: the liar, Curry, validity curry, and many more all involve some essential use of
Contraction. By dropping contraction, philosophers and logicians have aimed to provide a
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single uniform solution to the semantic paradoxes: seemingly any semantic paradox can be
solved by dropping Contraction.2
Consider the following derivations of the Liar, Curry, and Validity Curry paradoxes:

Liar Paradox
Let λ be a sentence such that the term xλy is the name for the sentence T pxλyq. The paradox
can be derived as follows:
λ $ λ
T-intro
λ $ T pxλyq
␣L
λ, ␣T pxλyq $
def. of λ
␣T pxλyq, ␣T pxλyq $
Contraction
␣T pxλyq $
$

λ $ λ
T-intro
T pxλyq $ λ
␣R
$ λ, ␣T pxλyq
def. of λ
$ ␣T pxλyq, ␣T pxλyq
Contraction
$ ␣T pxλyq
Cut

Curry’s Paradox
Let κ be a sentence such that the term xκy is the name for the sentence T xκy Ñ K. The
paradox can be derived in two parts:
Part A is a derivation of T xκy $ K:
T pxκyq $ T pxκyq
K $ K
ÑL
T xκy, T xκy Ñ K $ K
def. of κ
T xκy, κ $ K
T-intro
T xκy, T xκy $ K
Contraction
T xκy $ K
Part B uses two occurrences of Part A to derive $ K:
[Part A]
T xκy $ K
ÑR
$ T xκy Ñ K
def. of κ
$ κ
$ K
2

[Part A]
T xκy $ K

See, for example, [14], [26], [27], [19], [20], [4], [10], [25], and [5].

Cut

CHAPTER 3. INFINITE-PREMISE PARADOXES

49

Validity Curry Paradox
Let V alpx, yq be a predicate representing validity, which is governed by the following two
rules:
Validity Proof :
Γ$∆
VP
$ V alpxΓy, x∆yq
Validity Detachment:

Γ, V alpxΓy, x∆yq $ ∆

VD

Let π be a sentence such that xπy is a name for the sentence saying that the inference
from π to K is valid: V alpxπy, xKyq. Like the original Curry paradox, $ K can be derived in
two parts:3
Part A is a derivation of π $ K, using only (VD) and Contraction:
VD
π, V alpxπy, xKyq $ K
def. of π
π, π $ K
Contraction
π $ K
Part B uses Part A, along with (VP) and Cut, to derive $ K:
[Part A]
π $ K
VP
$ V alpxπy, xKyq
def. of π
$ π
$ K

[Part A]
π $ K

Cut

All three of these paradoxes, and many others, require Contraction. Dropping Contraction blocks these derivations, and blocks each derivation at the exact same step. And in fact,
several noncontractive logics have been proven to be consistent and nontrivial; there is no
3

This presentation of the validity curry paradox is based on that of [4].
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derivation of $ K.4 Noncontractive approaches therefore appear to provide a uniform solution to semantic paradoxes: they solve the semantics paradoxes, and solve each paradox in
the exact same way. Every paradox is given the same diagnosis: an illicit use of Contraction.
This is particularly useful in so-called “structural paradoxes” like the validity curry.5 These
paradoxes do not involve logical operators like negations or conditionals, and so cannot be
solved by the usual methods employed by paracomplete and paraconsistent logics.

3.2.1

Rejecting Contraction

In order for Contraction to fail, it is important that the premises and conclusions be collected
in multisets, rather than sets. Sets automatically contract: the set tA, Au just is the set
tAu. But multisets can have multiple occurrences of the same member: the multiset rA, As
is distinct from the multiset rAs.
In sequents with multiple multisets separated by a comma, such as Γ, Σ $ ∆, the comma
is understood as multiset sum, or ‘. Γ, ∆ is the sum Γ ‘ ∆, which is the multiset that
contains every formula that occurs in either Γ or ∆, the number of occurrences of that
formula is the sum of the number of occurrences in Γ plus the number of occurrences in ∆.6
One consequence of this failure is that different ways of formulating the operational rules
governing connectives, which are equivalent in the presence of Contraction and Weakening,
are no longer equivalent. Different choices of rules will result in different versions of the
logical connectives. For example, we might introduce the conjunction ^ using the following
“multiplicative” rules:
Γ, A, B $ ∆
m^L
Γ, A ^ B $ ∆
Γ $ A, ∆
Γ1 $ B, ∆1
m^R
Γ, Γ1 $ A ^ B, ∆, ∆1
4

See, for example, [14] and [26].
See [10] and [4].
6
See [16] for a very helpful discussion of these issues.
5
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Or alternatively, we might introduce conjunction using the following “additive” rules:
Γ, A $ ∆
a^L
Γ, A ^ B $ ∆

Γ, B $ ∆
a^L
Γ, A ^ B $ ∆

Γ $ A, ∆
Γ $ B, ∆
a^R
Γ $ A ^ B∆
Without Contraction (and Weakening), these rules are not equivalent. For example,
suppose we have derived:
Γ, A, B $ ∆
If we only have the additive conjunction rules, then this does not get us:
Γ, A ^ B $ ∆
Rather, we can only derive:
Γ, A ^ B, A ^ B $ ∆
by applying the a^L rule twice; once to A, and once to B. Thus one occurrence of
the additive conjunction of A and B is in some ways logically weaker than A and B taken
as separate premises. The fact that we have A, B $ ∆ does not guarantee that we have
A ^ B $ ∆ if ^ obeys the additive conjunction rules.
One consequence of this additive/multiplicative split is that not every classical inference
can be recovered by either multiplicative connectives or additive connectives alone. For
example, if ^ is the additive version of the conjunction, then although we have one version
of Explosion:
A, ␣A $ B
for all A and B, we do not have the following version:
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A ^ ␣A $ B
for all A and B. We only have this weaker version:
A ^ ␣A, A ^ ␣A $ B
However, if ^ is the multiplicative conjunction, then we do have the usual conjunctive
Explosion rule:
A ^ ␣A $ B
It follows directly from
A, ␣A $ B
by one application of m^L. However, the inference
A$A^A
is not valid for the multiplicative conjunction. You need two occurrences of A to get the
multiplicative conjunction A ^ A.
Despite this, there are ways to combine these rules to recover all classically valid inferences. For example, [17] provides a noncontractive system (which is also nontransitive) that
has mixed rules (multiplicative on the left and additive on the right) and validates all of
the classically valid inferences. In [10], Mares and Paoli defend a system of linear logic that
contains all of the multiplicative and additive rules, giving us two versions of each connective: one additive and one multiplicative. They argue that classically valid inferences are
all ambiguous between the two sorts of connectives, and show that every classically valid
inference has a disambiguation that is valid in their formal system.
This division of connectives into additive and multiplicative versions is important, as it
prevents derivations of the paradoxes that don’t directly involve Contraction. For example,
consider the following derivation:
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λ$λ
␣L
λ, ␣λ $
λ$λ
λ $ ␣λ
m^L
a^R
λ ^ ␣λ $
λ $ λ ^ ␣λ
Cut
λ$
␣R
$ ␣λ
This would make the negation of the liar sentence a theorem; a quick application of
the truth rules would get us a contradiction, and triviality. This derivation conflates multiplicative conjunction with additive conjunction, and thus allows us to sneak in a form of
Contraction. We can see this in the following derivation:

Γ, A, A $ ∆
A$A
A$A
m^L
a^R
Γ, A ^ A $ ∆
A$A^A
Cut
Γ, A $ ∆
In effect, conflating the two sorts of connective rules would allow us to sneak a hidden
form of contraction into proofs. In the example shown here, the additive conjunction of A
and A is equivalent to once occurrence of A, but the multiplicative conjunction of A and A
is equivalent to two occurrences of A. Conflating the two sorts of conjunction is thus really
a form of Contraction. It is therefore vital that the two versions of the connective rules be
kept separate in a noncontractive system.
Different noncontractive logics will validate different combinations of these connective
rules. The noncontractive system presented in [26], for example, uses exclusively multiplicative connective rules for the logical connectives and the quantifiers. The system defended in
[21] uses exclusively additive connective rules. The system presented in [17] uses multiplicative rules on the left side of the $, and additive rules on the right side (but avoids the above
derivation by also rejecting Cut). And the system defended in [10] uses both sets of rules,
and therefore has two conjunction connectives, two disjunction connectives, etc.
Not all connectives will have an additive/multiplicative split. The rules for negation, for
example, have no such division:
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Γ ñ A∆
Γ␣A ñ ∆

␣R

Γ, A ñ ∆
Γ ñ ␣A∆
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The case of the quantifiers is unique because, like negation, there is only one traditional
set of rules for the quantifier. Yet the usual quantifier rules are distinctly additive, and so
are not exactly unsplit in the way that negation is. For example, consider the left-side rule
for the universal quantifier:
Γ, Aptq $ ∆
@L
Γ, @xApxq $ ∆
If we think of universal quantification as analogous to a very large conjunction, we can see
that this rule is much more like the additive left-side conjunction rule than the multiplicative
left-side conjunction rule. The other quantifier rules are similarly additive in nature. But
there is no consensus as to how multiplicative quantifiers should work. In [12], Paoli argues
that there should be both multiplicative and additive quantifiers, and makes some suggestions
for how multiplicative quantifiers ought to work. In [26], Zardini introduces multiplicative
rules for the quantifiers along the lines suggested by Paoli. These quantifiers are unique, in
part because the introduction rule for the universal quantifier has infinitely many premises.
For example, here are the rules for the universal quantifier (notation adjusted):
Γ, At0 {x , At1 {x , At2 {x , At3 {x , ¨ ¨ ¨ $ ∆
@L
Γ, @xA $ ∆
Γ0 $ ∆0 , At0 {x

Γ1 $ ∆1 , At1 {x
Γ2 $ ∆2 , At2 {x
Γ3 $ ∆3 , At3 {x
Ů
Ů
0ďiăω pΓi q $
0ďiăω p∆i q, @xA

¨¨¨
@R

In Zardini’s system, there must be a term ti for every object in the domain. So if we have
Ati {x for all i ď ω, then we have that every object in the domain is in the extension of A.
Thus we can see that these multiplicative quantifier rules are analogous to the multiplicative
conjunction rules, just as the usual universal quantifier rules are analogous to the additive
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conjunction rules. For example in the left side rule, we must already have sentences saying
that every object is in the extension of A before we can introduce the universal quantification
that effectively “conjoins” those sentences, just as we must already have both conjuncts
before we can conjoin them with the multiplicative conjunction:
Γ, A, B $ ∆
m^L
Γ, A ^ B $ ∆
Note that these multiplicative quantifier rules require both inferences and metainferences
that have infinitely many premises. In the @L rule, we have infinitely many premises on
the left side of the turnstile. In the @R rule, we have infinitely many premises in the
metainferential rule itself.7
In the following sections, I will present a series of paradoxes do not use the structural rule
of Contraction, and thus pose problems for noncontractive approaches given a sufficiently
expressive vocabulary. The paradoxes of section 3.3 require that the logic contain some a
multiplicative connectives, but the paradoxes of sections 3.4 and 3.5 do not involve logical
connectives and apply to any noncontractive logic that tolerates countably infinite collections
of premises, regardless of whether the connectives are additive or multiplicative.

3.3
Let

Infinite Conjunction Paradoxes

Ź

be a multiplicative countable conjunction connective, which we can think of as conŹ
joining all of the members of a (possibly infinite) countable multiset. We will write
Γ to
refer to the conjunction of all of the members of γ.
Ź
obeys the following rules:
7

However, Da Ré and Rosenblatt raise several problems for these quanitifers in [7].Da Ré and Rosenblatt show that Zardini’s logical system, when given a transparent truth predicate and a small amount of
arithmetic, leads to triviality. They show that their argument will not work for a noncontractive system
that contains only the usual “additive” quantifiers, which suggests that the problem is indeed Zardini’s
quantifiers.
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Ź
ŹΓ $ ∆
L
Γ$∆
Γ1 $ A1 , ∆1
Γ2 $ A2 , ∆2
...
Γn $ An , ∆n
... Ź
Ź
R
Γ1 , Γ2 , ...Γn ... $ rAi s, ∆1 , ∆2 , ...∆n ...
Ź
Given these rules, we can prove that
obeys the following introduction rule (at least in
the presence of Cut):
Ź

Ź
Γ, A $ ∆
Ź
-intro
pΓ ‘ rAsq $ ∆
For all γ P Γ, we have:
γ$γ
Thus:
γ$γ
...
Ź
Γ$ Γ
Thus by Cut, we have:
Ź

Ź
Γ, A $ ∆
Γ$ Γ
Γ, A $ ∆
Ź
pΓ ‘ rAsq $ ∆

In particular, this means that we can have an countably infinite conjunction of occurrences of a sentence A. Importantly, this builds in a sort of contraction to the system. Let
rAsω be the multiset consisting of countably infinitely many occurrences of A, and nothing
else. If we have rAsω , A $ ∆, this is the same thing as rAsω $ ∆. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the comma in noncontractive multiset sequent calculi must be understood
as multiset sum, or ‘: A formula appears in Γ, ∆ the sum of the number of times that it
appears in Γ and the number of times it appears in ∆. But in cases where a multiset has
infinitely many occurrences of a formula, we will get a de facto Contraction when we add
another occurrence; the sum of ℵ0 and 1 is still ℵ0 .
Using this infinite conjunction, we can derive paradoxes analogous to the normal liar and
curry paradoxes.
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An Infinitary Liar Paradox
Let L be a sentence in L such that xLy is the name for the sentence

Ź
r␣T xLysω . We can

divide the paradoxical derivation into four parts.
Ź
Part A derives L $ using the derived
introduction rule, the truth rules, and the rules
for negation:
L$L
T-intro
L $ T xLy
Ź
def. of L
r␣T xLysω $ T xLy
Ź
␣L
r␣T xLysω , ␣T xLy $ Ź
Ź
-intro
pr␣T xLysω ‘ ␣T xLyq $
pr␣T xLysω ‘ ␣T xLyq “ r␣T xLysω
Ź
r␣T xLysω $
def. of L
L$
Part B derives $ ␣T xLy using Part A, truth rules, and the rules for negation:
L$
T-intro
T xLy $
␣R
$ ␣T xLy
Ź
Part C derives $ L using Part B and R:
$ ␣T xLy
$ ␣T xLy
... Ź
Ź
R
$ r␣T xLysω
def. of L
$L
Part D derives the empty sequent $ using Parts A and C, and Cut:
L$

$L
$

Cut

This version of the liar paradox does not involve Contraction. The only contraction-like
Ź
Ź
step is the move from pr␣T xLysω ‘ ␣T xLyq $ to r␣T xLysω $ in Part A. But this is
not Contraction; this is just a fact about countably infinite multisets: the sum of a multiset
containing ℵ0 -many occurrences of A with a multiset containing one occurrence of A is a
multiset containing ℵ0 occurrences of A. Giving up Contraction does nothing to avoid this.

CHAPTER 3. INFINITE-PREMISE PARADOXES

58

An Infinitary Curry Paradox
Let K be a sentence in L such that the term xKy is the name for the sentence

Ź

rT xKysω ⊸

K. We can again derive the paradox in four parts.
Ź
Part A uses the derived
introduction rule, the truth rules, and the multiplicative
Ź
conditional rules to derive rT xKysω $ K:
Ź
Ź
rT xKysω $ rT xKysω
K$K
Ź
Ź
⊸L
rT xKysω , rT xKysω ⊸ K $ K
Ź
def. of K
rT xKysω , K $ K
Ź
T-intro
rT xKysω , T xKy $ K Ź
Ź
-intro
rT xKysω ‘ rT xKys $ K
pr␣T xKysω ‘ ␣T xKyq “ r␣T xKysω
Ź
rT xKysω $ K
Part B uses Part A, the truth rules and the multiplicative conditional rules to derive
$ T xKy:
Ź
rT xKysω $ K
Ź
⊸R
$ rT xKysω ⊸ K
def. of K
$K
T-intro
$ T xKy
Ź
Ź
Part C uses Part B and R to derive $ rT xKysω :
$ T xKy
$ T xKy
Ź
$ rT xKysω

... Ź
R

Part D uses Parts A and C and Cut to derive $ K:
$

Ź
ω

T xKy

Ź
ω

$K

T xKy $ K

Cut

Like the infinitary liar paradox, this version of the Curry paradox does not rely on
Contraction; it only uses basic facts about the sum operator ‘ for infinite multisets.
Both of these paradoxes use a countable conjunction connective in order to conjoin infinitely many premises into a single sentence, and the infinitary curry paradox involves a
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multiplicative conditional. But we do not need such a conjunction or such a conditional in
order to produce contraction-free paradoxes: we can get infinitary validity curry paradoxes
in any noncontractive logic as long as the language contains a validity predicate and names
for (possibly infinite) multisets.

3.4

An Infinitary Validity Curry Paradox

[10] distinguishes between internal and external validity. Roughly, B is an internal consequence of A iff A $ B, and B is an external consequence of A iff
$A
$B
In this section, I’ll introduce infinite-premise versions of the validity curry paradox for
both internal and external validity.
Let L be a language that contain names not only for formulas, but for countable multisets
of formulas. If we allow L to have names for all multisets of formulas, then due to Cantor’s
Theorem we will have strictly more terms than formulas, which is impossible. To avoid this,
while still allowing ourselves to talk about multisets in the object language, we will restrict
our set of multiset names to include names only for multisets that contain finitely many
distinct formulas. So we do not have a name for the multiset containing one occurrence of
every formula in L, but we do have a name for the multiset containing ℵ0 occurrences of
0 “ 0. In a countable language, there can only be countably many multisets of finite base,
and cardinality problems are avoided.
I’ll use rAsn to refer to the multiset containing exactly n occurrences of A (and no other
formula). I’ll let rAsω be the multiset containing ℵ0 occurrences of A, and no other formula.
I’ll use xΓy for the name for Γ, where Γ is a countable multiset containing at most finitely
many distinct formulas.
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I’ll assume that we can define a function f px, yq such that f pn, xAyq “ xrAsn y for all
n ă ω, and that f pω, xAyq “ rAsω .
Let our validity predicate V alpx, yq take names for multisets as the first argument, and
names for formulas as the second argument.
Let V alpx, yq obey the following rules, where Γ and ∆ are countable multisets containing
at most finitely many distinct formulas:
Validity Proof :
Γ$∆
(VP)
$ V alpxΓy, x∆yq
Validity Detachment:

Γ, V alpxΓy, x∆yq $ ∆

(VD)

Given these rules, we run the risk of paradox. Normally, in a noncontractive logic, we
understand Γ, Γ1 $ ∆ as a way of writing Γ ‘ Γ1 $ ∆, where Γ ‘ Γ1 is the multiset such that
A occurs in Γ ‘ Γ1 the sum of the number of times it occurs in Γ and the number of times
it occurs in Γ1 .
See e.g. [26]: “We form pairwise and countable combinations of multisets using cardinal
summation”, taking the comma in the premises to reflect this ‘-style multiset combination.
The problem for noncontractive approaches is that the sum of ℵ0 and 1 is ℵ0 , so rAsω ‘
tAu “ rAsω .
Let π “ V alpf pω, xπyq, xKyq.
We can derive $ π in the following way. First, we derive rπsω $ K:
VD
rπsω , V alpxrπsω y, xKyq $ K
def. of f(x,y)
rπsω , V alpf pω, xπyq, xKyq $ K
def. of π
rπsω , π $ K
rπsω ‘ π “ rπsω
rπsω $ K
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From this, we can derive $ π:
rπsω $ K
VP
$ V alpxrπsω y, xKyq
def. of f px, yq
$ V alpf pω, xπyq, xKyq
def. of π
$π
So then we have $ π and rπsω $ K. If we could use infinitely many occurrences of
Cut, we’d get $ K. [26] allows for metainferences with countably infinitely many premises
(that’s how his quantifier introduction rules are defined). So let’s assume that we accept the
following rule for all multisets Γ:
Γ$A

$ γ1

...
$A

$ γi

...

for all γi P Γ (note that γi and γi`1 may be occurrences of the same formula).
For finite Γ, this is a derivable rule using finitely many instances of Cut. I don’t see any
compelling philosophical reason why it should fail in the infinitary case when it works in
finite cases.
But if we have that rule for infinite Γ, then $ π and rπsω $ K gives us $ K.
That is, as long as we can use $ π as many times as we’d like. But if VD is valid in the
system, then we proved $ π earlier. We didn’t just assume it, and so we should be able to
use it as many times as we want.
And in that case, we have $ K.

3.5

An External Validity Paradox

The above validity curry paradox uses what Mares and Paoli [10] call internal consequence.
A is an internal consequence of B if A $ B is valid. But Mares and Paoli also consider
external consequence. A is an external consequence of B iff
$A
$B
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is valid.
Although Zardini takes his noncontractive system to allow for infinitely many premises
both for internal and external consequence, Mares and Paoli explicitly take internal consequence to be finitary. As such, they will not accept the above paradoxes as applying to their
chosen logic.
However, Mares and Paoli explicitly take external consequence to be infinitary: we can
have infinitely many premises when dealing with external consequence.
Mares and Paoli argue that their system should not contain a validity predicate for
external consequence. Mares and Paoli appear to reject an external validity predicate in
part because it would allow the validity curry paradox to reappear. Mares and Paoli take
external validity to contract, and take the validity curry to be solved by giving up contraction.
So if we allow for an external validity predicate, there will be no way to block the paradox.
This is not particularly satisfying. They offer no principled reason as to why an external
validity predicate is undesirable, save for the fact that it would lead to paradox. But if
external validity is a coherent concept that we are using in our logic, then we should be
able to model it non-trivially with a formal predicate. Mares and Paoli allow for an internal
consequence validity predicate, so it seems arbitrary to allow one validity predicate but not
the other, given that both notions of consequence are vital to their system.
But the noncontractivist need not deny the coherence of an external validity predicate
in order to avoid an externalized validity curry. [24] shows that an external validity curry
paradox can only arise in the presence of contraction for metainferences. Namely, the paradox
requires that if
$A

$A
$B

is a valid metainference, then
$A
$B
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is too. But the noncontractivist does not need to claim that this is the case. The
noncontractivist only needs to claim that we can contract on the sentences that we have
proven. [25] argues that if $ A is just a hypothetical assumption, rather than a sequent that
we have derived in the sequent calculus, then the noncontractivist is free to argue that we
cannot contract on $ A without having to thereby deny that we can use theorems as many
times as we’d like. The noncontractivist can maintain that there is a significant difference
between
$A

$A
$B

and
$A
$B
while still allowing us to contract on theorems. This, combined with the results of [24],
means that noncontractivists are free to allow for an external validity predicate and allow
us to contract on theorems without running the risk of triviality.
Let EV ALpx, yq be a predicate expressing validity for external consequence, which takes
as arguments names for multisets with finite root sets. I will write xΓy as the name for the
multiset Γ. When no confusion can result, I will write xAy as the name for the singleton
multiset xrAsy. The predicate should obey the following external variants of (VP) and (VD),
where Γ “ rγ1 , γ2 , ...s:
External Validity Proof : if
$ γ1

$ γ2
$B

...

then

$ EV ALpxΓy, xByq
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External Validity Detachment:
$ EV ALpxΓy, xByq

$ γ1
$B

$ γ2

...

These rules, taken together with the assumption that external validity always contracts,
leads to paradox. Let ϵ be a sentence such that ϵ “ EV ALpxϵy, xKyq.
By external validity detachment, we have:
$ EV ALpxϵy, xKyq
$K

$ϵ

But ϵ “ EV ALpxϵy, xKyq, so this is equivalent to
$ϵ

$ϵ
$K

By external contraction, we have:
$ϵ
$K
And by external validity proof, we have:

$ EV ALpxϵy, xKyq
But again, ϵ “ EV ALpxϵy, xKyq, so this is equivalent to

$ϵ
We proved earlier that
$ϵ
$K
And therefore, by external Cut, we have:
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$K
And thus, we have paradox. But notice that $ ϵ had not been derived when we contracted
on it. It was, in effect, just an external assumption in the valid metainference that is external
validity detachment. If we reject contraction for hypothetical assumptions that have not been
proven, as [24] and [25] point out, then this use of contraction is illegitimate.
However, this does not completely avoid the problem. An external validity paradox arises
even if we give up external contraction for unproven assumptions. The paradox does not
require contraction; it only requires that external validity allows for infinitely many premises,
which Mares and Paoli explicitly take it to do.
Let rAsω be the multiset containing countably infinitely many occurrences of A, and no
other formulas. Let η be a sentence such that η “ EV ALpxrηsω y, xKyq.8 We can then derive
$ K even without contraction.
By external validity detachment, we have:
$ EV ALpxrηsω y, xKyq
$η
$K

$η

...

But η “ EV ALpxrηsω y, xKyq, so this is equivalent to
$η

$η
$η
$K

...

And by external validity proof, we have:

$ EV ALpxrηsω y, xKyq
But again, η “ EV ALpxrηsω y, xKyq, so this is equivalent to

$η
8

If our naming convention is sufficiently Gödel-like, then we can do with using a recursive function f px, yq
such that f pn, xAyq “ xrAsn y for all n ă ω ` 1. For simplicity, I’ll just assume that we can define such a
sentence directly.
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We have therefore proven $ η. This is not a hypothetical assumption, but a derived
sequent. We can therefore use it as many times as we want in a proof. And we proved earlier
that
$η

$η
$η
$K

...

So therefore, we have:

$K
This proof does not use contraction on any assumptions. If we allow for infinitary sequent
proofs, as Zardini [26] does, then this does not use contraction at all.9 We can simply
append the proof of $ η infinitely many times, and have a direct proof of $ K without
any use of external contraction. But if we do not allow for infinitary proofs, then the
derivation of $ K only contracts on a derived sequent, $ η. Even noncontractivists allow
contraction on theorems that we have proved. That is an important part of the defense of
noncontractive solutions mounted by [25], [10], [6], and others. If we cannot use theorems as
many times as we would like, then it would seem that all hope of recovering mathematics is
lost. Mathematicians need to be able to use theorems arbitrarily many times.

3.6

Discussion

None of the above infinitary paradoxes require Contraction in the usual sense. Contraction
is in some sense unavoidable, due to simple facts about transfinite arithmetic: ℵ0 ` 1 “ ℵ0 .
This is most obviously a problem for Zardini’s system, presented in [26], because Zardini’s
system explicitly allows for countably infinite multisets of premises, and his multiplicative
quantifiers require metainferences with infinite premises. This is also a problem for the
9

Note that Zardini’s multiplicative quantifiers require infinitely many premises in their introduction rule,
so this feature cannot easily be removed from his system.
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system defended by Mares and Paoli in [10], since their system allows for infinitely many
premises when dealing with external consequence.
The paradoxes above are a general problem facing all noncontractive approaches. When
dealing with infinitely many premises—as we do when we ask about the consequences of
ZFC, and the like—giving up the structural rule of Contraction cannot avoid paradox. Any
noncontractive approach that aims to provide a uniform solution to semantic paradoxes
must be able to avoid these paradoxes, and explain why they do not pose a problem for the
approach.
One option is to argue that an infinitary logic ought to use sequences, rather than multisets. We could thereby avoid infinitary contraction by allowing sequences of any countable
ordinal. For although the cardinal ℵ0 “ ℵ0 ` 1, this is not true for ordinals: ω ‰ ω ` 1. However, this will not prevent infinitary paradoxes. For even in ordinal arithmetic, 1 ` ω “ ω.
As such, as long as we have the structural rule of Permutation:
Γ, A, B, Γ1 , $ ∆
Permutation
Γ, B, A, Γ1 $ ∆
the paradoxes will reappear. We can use the infinitary liar paradox as an example. Suppose
that we take premises and conclusions to be sequences, rather than multisets. Given a
formula A and a countable ordinal α, let tAuα be the α-length sequence of occurrences of
A. Let ‘ be a concatenation operator, such that Γ ‘ ∆ is the sequence consisting of all of
the γs in Γ followed by all of the δs in ∆. When no confusion can arise, I will use A ‘ Γ for
tAu1 ‘ Γ. Note that A ‘ tAuω “ tAuω .
Suppose again that we have a conjunction

Ź

, which obeys the following rules:

Ź
ŹΓ $ ∆
L
Γ$∆
Γ1 $ A1 , ∆1
Γ2 $ A2 , ∆2
...
Γn $ An , ∆n
Ź
Γ1 , Γ2 , ...Γn ... $ rAi s, ∆1 , ∆2 , ...∆n ...

... Ź

R
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Where here Γs and ∆s are sequences. Note in the presence of Cut,

Ź

will obey the

following introduction rule:
Ź
A, Γ $ ∆ Ź
Ź
-intro
pA ‘ Γq $ ∆
For all γ P Γ, we have:

γ$γ
Thus:
γ$γ
...
Ź
Γ$ Γ
Thus by Cut, we have:
A,

Ź

Γ$∆
Γ$
A, Γ $ ∆
Ź
pA ‘ Γq $ ∆

Ź

Γ

Given such a conjunction, we will get triviality without Contraction even if we take
premises and conclusions to be sequences rather than multisets. Let L the sentence such
Ź
that xLy is the name for the sentence t␣T xLyuω . The derivation is analogous to the
multiset version given in section 3.3; only Part A is different:
L$L
T-intro
L $ T xLy
␣L
L, ␣T xLy $
Permutation
␣T xLy, L $
Ź
def. of L
␣T xLy, t␣T xLyuω $ Ź
Ź
-intro
p␣T xLy ‘ t␣T xLyuω q $
␣T xLy ‘ t␣T xLyuω “ t␣T xLyuω
Ź
t␣T xLyuω $
def. of L
L$
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Parts B and C are exactly the same, with only minor notation variations. The other
infinitary paradoxes can be similarly adapted to a sequence setting.
Note that in the above derivation, Permutation is applied only to sentences; we are
not permuting transfinite sequences, which may be considered problematic, as it involves
infinitely many syntactic steps. The assumption that we can permute adjacent sentences
in a sequence seems to be a very minor assumption, and one that is almost certainly safe
in many contexts. It seems very implausible that the order in which you list premises can
change what follows from those premises. For the noncontractive approach to avoid infinitary
paradoxes, it is therefore not enough to argue that an infinitary logic must involve infinite
sequences, rather than infinite multisets.
Another option is simply to deny the coherence of infinitary conjunction or an infinitary
Val-predicate rules. But such a restriction on vocabulary seems hopelessly ad hoc, and
threatens to undermine the noncontractivist’s claim of a uniform solution. Part of the
appeal of substructural logics is supposed to be that, unlike more traditional nonclassical
approaches that have to adjust the rules for different connectives to solve different paradoxes,
substructural logics can solve the paradoxes in one stroke. The fact that paradox can arise
with infinite conjunction and no Val predicate, and also arise with a Val predicate and
no infinite conjunction, suggests that neither piece of vocabulary is really the underlying
problem. So solving the paradox by restricting either or both pieces of vocabulary would
fail to provide a uniform diagnosis of the infinitary paradoxes, and instead make only ad
hoc vocabulary restrictions. And besides, neither piece of vocabulary seems particularly
problematic. Infinite conjunctions are perfectly coherent, and are often used in mathematics,
such as in the usual presentation of Vaught’s conjecture.10 And once you’ve allowed for
valid infinitary inferences, your validity predicate should allow you to talk about them.
There seems to be no principled reason to reject infinitary conjunctions or infinitary validity
10

See e.g.[2], [1], [23], and [11].
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predicates once we have allowed arguments with infinitely many premises.
The more promising option for the noncontractivist is to forbid arguments with infinitely many premises, and to insist that we only ever consider inferences with finitely
many premises. The noncontractivist can claim that they are only interested in inferences
as proof-theoretic objects, meaning that an inference Γ $ ∆ indicates that there exists a
proof taking the γs as assumptions that has (one of) the δs as its conclusion. Since a proof
can only contain finitely many steps, inferences with infinitely many premises are simply
beside the point. As a result, the noncontractivist may argue that these apparent paradoxes
aren’t really paradoxes for their noncontractive systems, because these paradoxes involve a
completely unrelated notion of inference.
In many contexts, when we are interested in the exact premises that we need in order to
prove a conclusion, we may not need or want infinite multisets of premises. In linear logic,
which does not include Weakening as a rule, this may be the question we are interested in.11
No proof ever has infinitely many premises, so no infinite set of premises is the exact set of
premises needed for a proof.
However, there are certainly some contexts in which we want to ask whether or not the
premises we have are sufficient to prove something. This is the question that Cintula and
Paoli take affine logic (linear logic + weakening) to be suitable for ([6]; fn. 7).
If we allow for weakening, and we are interested in what our premises are sufficient
to prove, then it seems arbitrary to restrict to finite multisets of premises. We are often
interested in knowing what an infinite set of premises can be used to prove. ZFC, for
example, is not finitely axiomatizable. But we certainly want to ask what those axioms are
sufficient to prove. And when we ask that question, we are not assuming that we can have
infinitely long proofs; we are instead interested in what finite proofs can be constructed using
the resources in that infinite set of axioms.
11

For more on linear logic, see [9] and [22].
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Defenders of the noncontractive approach may argue that they can give an indirect account of the consequences of an infinite collection of axioms as follows: A is a consequence
of the infinite collection Γ iff ∆ $ A for some finite ∆ Ă Γ. Let’s use Ź as a symbol for this
notion: Γ Ź A iff there exists a finite sub-multiset ∆ of Γ such that ∆ $ A.
Unfortunately, the paradox will reappear as soon as we move to reasoning with Ź. Let
IN F V ALpx, yq be a predicate representing Ź. If this predicate is going to represent Ź, then
by analogy to V al and $, IN F V AL should obey the following rules:
Infinitary Validity Proof :
ΓŹ∆
(IVP)
Ź V alpxΓy, x∆yq
Infinitary Validity Detachment:

Γ, V alpxΓy, x∆yq Ź ∆

(IVD)

Let π “ IN F V ALpf pω, xπyq, xKyq.
We can derive Ź π in the following way. First, we derive rπsω Ź K:
IVD
rπsω , V alpxrπsω y, xKyq Ź K
def. of f(x,y)
rπsω , V alpf pω, xπyq, xKyq Ź K
def. of π
rπsω , π Ź K
rπsω ‘ π “ rπsω
rπsω Ź K
From this, we can derive Ź π:
rπsω Ź K
IVP
Ź V alpxrπsω y, xKyq
def. of f px, yq
Ź V alpf pω, xπyq, xKyq
def. of π
Źπ
Given the definition of Ź, Ź π entails $ π. And we also have rπsω Ź K, which means
that there is a finite sub-multiset Γ of rπsω such that Γ $ K. Γ must be a multiset containing
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finitely many instances of π, so from Γ $ π and $ π we need only finitely many applications
of Cut to get $ K.
Therefore even if the noncontractivist aims to give an indirect characterization of what
it means to be a consequence of an infinite collection of premises, paradox will once again
rear its ugly head. This means that, for the noncontractivist to give a uniform solution to
semantic paradoxes, they must deny that there is any usable notion of consequence according
to which we can have infinitely many premises, or can contract on premises.
The problem then is that, as a simple matter of empirical fact, we are often interested
in the consequences of infinite collections of premises. As long as we are interested in the
consequences of infinite collections of axioms (and mathematics does not seem to be losing
interest in that question any time soon) we should be able to formulate a consequence relation
that tolerates infinitely many premises. And once we do that, noncontractive approaches
are no longer sufficient to avoid paradoxes.
Thus to avoid the paradoxes here, the noncontractivist would have to say that there is
no coherent sense to be made of infinitely many premises. But given that many (perhaps
most) of the axiom sets that interest mathematicians are infinite, this is untenable. This
means that there are notions of consequence that the noncontractive approach to paradox
simply ignores. As such, the noncontractive approach does not provide a uniform solution to
semantic paradoxes. It may solve the paradoxes for specific contexts—contexts in which we
are interested in resource-conscious proofs—but it does not solve the paradoxes in general.
The paradoxes still arise in cases where we are interested in the consequences of infinite
collections of axioms, and the noncontractive approach does nothing to solve the paradoxes
in those contexts.

CHAPTER 3. INFINITE-PREMISE PARADOXES

3.7

73

Contraction and Closure

The above paradoxes show that noncontractive approaches cannot allow us to ask about the
consequences of infinite collections of non-logical axioms. This is a symptom of a general
problem for noncontractive approaches: a noncontractive logic cannot tell us what the consequences of a collection of axioms are, because we must make a choice about which proofs
to use the axioms in. We can only use an instance of an axiom once, and we must choose how
we use it. Given an instance of A ^ B, we must choose whether to infer A or to infer B from
it; we cannot infer both A and B from a single occurrence of A ^ B, regardless of whether
^ is additive or multiplicative. As such, there is no fact about what the consequences of our
axioms are; they can only give us some options from which to choose.
This problem arises because noncontractive consequence relations are not closure operators. A closure operator C(X) is an operator on sets (or multisets) such that:
1. X Ď CpXq
2. if X Ď Y then CpXq Ď CpY q
3. CpXq “ CpCpXq
Ordinarily, a (single-conclusion) consequence relation $ corresponds to a closure operator
CpXq, such that Γ $ A iff A P CpΓq. This give us the usual properties that we want:
(1) gives us identity: A $ A
(2) gives us monotonicity: Γ $ A implies Γ, B $ A
(3) gives us “Cautious Cut”: Γ $ A and Γ, A $ B implies Γ $ B.
But giving up Cut or Contraction for a consequence relation means that we cannot have
closure. (3) gives us Cut, automatically. And (1), (2) and (3) together give us Contraction:
Suppose Γ, A, A $ B.
By (1), A $ A.
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By (2), Γ, A $ A.
By (3), Γ, A $ B.
In [16], Ripley shows that any consequence relation that corresponds to a closure operator and validates Cut must also validate Contraction. That means that noncontractive
consequence relations cannot correspond to closure operators.
This is a serious problem, particularly if we want to use our logic to add non-logical
axioms and find out what they entail. When we want to discover the consequences of a
collection of non-logical axioms like ZFC, what we want is a closure operator. Normally can
take e.g. the axioms of ZFC, and know that there is a singular set of theorems provable from
those axioms. This is the closure of the axioms.
This is what allows us to use a collection of axioms to present an entire theory. As Beall
puts it in [3]. “Give to logic your theory Γ, and then sit back: logic ‘freely’ or ‘automatically’
expands your theory to CpΓq, which contains all of Γ’s (singleton) consequences.”
This power of a logic is dependent on it corresponding to a closure operator. Without a
closure operator, we cannot use a logic to present the entirety of a theory using just a set of
axioms, and we cannot use a logic to discover the consequences of a collection of non-logical
axioms.
Classical logic, paracomplete logics, and paraconsistent logics all do this: they each
correspond to a closure operator, and therefore we can use these logics to discover the
consequences of a collection of axioms or assumptions in the usual way. But noncontractive
logics do not allow us to do this.
However, we are often concerned with discovering what the consequences of a collection
of assumptions or axioms are. Semantic paradoxes arise in those contexts. Noncontractive
logics cannot be used in those contexts, and so the noncontractive approach does nothing to
solve the paradoxes in those contexts.
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Conclusion

Noncontractive solutions to semantic paradoxes aim to provide a single uniform solution that
solves every semantic paradox by blocking Contraction. Even if this approach works well
for inferences with finitely many premises, it fails to solve paradoxes involving inferences
with infinitely many premises. In order to avoid such paradoxes, the noncontractivist would
have to deny that there is any coherent sense to be made of an inference with infinitely
many premises. But denying the coherence of inferences with infinitely many premises is
problematic, because not every theory we want to talk about is finitely axiomatizable. And
even if every theory were finitely axiomatizable, noncontractive logics still cannot give us a
single theory that is entailed by a collection of axioms: it can only give us some mutually
exclusive options of what we could prove from those axioms.
Much of mathematical research involves discovering the consequences of infinite collections of axioms like ZFC. The noncontractive approach does not allow us to discuss the
consequences of infinite collections like the ZFC axioms. If we can’t talk about what follows from an infinite (multi)set of premises, then it’s not clear how we can do anything
approaching contemporary mathematics. So even if noncontractivists are willing to revise
their systems of logic to block any and all occurrences of infinite collections of premises,
this would fail to provide a uniform solution to paradoxes. We are often interested in the
consequences of infinite collections of axioms. If noncontractive logics cannot be applied in
those contexts, then noncontractive logics simply do not solve the paradoxes as they arise in
those contexts. Rather than providing a uniform solution to paradoxes wherever they arise,
the noncontractive approach simply ignores many contexts in which we need a solution to
semantic paradoxes.
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Introduction

A substructural logic is any logic that gives up one of the usual structural rules, usually
either Cut or Contraction:1
Γ, A $ ∆
Γ1 $ A, ∆1
Cut
Γ, Γ1 $ ∆, ∆1
Γ, A, A $ ∆
Contraction
Γ, A $ ∆
Logics giving up Cut or Contraction are called nontransitive and noncontractive, respectively. Substructural approaches aim to provide a uniform solution to semantic paradoxes.2
Each semantic paradox involves either Cut or Contraction, and so supporters of substructural
approaches argue that rejecting one of these rules allows us to block all the usual paradoxical
arguments at the exact same step.
If successful, these substructural approaches can give us a single, uniform solution that
applies widely to all of the semantic paradoxes. By comparison, more traditional nonclassical
approaches appear somewhat ad hoc: paracomplete and paraconsistent approaches must give
up one rule to block the Liar Paradox, another to block Curry’s Paradox, and yet another
to block what Beall and Murzi [4] call the validity curry paradox.
The validity curry paradox is particularly problematic for fully structural approaches,
because the paradox uses only the structural rules of Cut and Contraction, plus very plausible rules governing a validity predicate. This paradox has been presented as a consideration
in favor of substructural approaches to semantic paradoxes.3 While paracomplete and paraconsistent approaches can tolerate a naive theory of truth, it seems that only substructural
logics can provide a naive theory of validity.
1

Although see [20] for a substructural logic that gives up Identity instead.
For recent defenses of noncontractive approaches, see [42], [41], [27], [28], [23], [5], [38], [37], and [36].
For recent defenses of nontransitive approaches, see [8], [6], [34], [33], [32], and [24].
3
See, for example, [33], [32], [42], [4], and [36].
2
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The validity curry paradox involves a validity predicate that is meant to represent the
validity relation between (multisets of) formulas. But those are not the only sorts of inferences that we’re interested in. We are also interested in metainferences: inferences between
inferences.
For example, Cut and Contraction are both metainferences: they take an inference as a
premise, and have an inference as a conclusion. To even be able to discuss whether or not
to move to a substructural logic, we need to be able to discuss which metainferences are
valid. But even in a classical setting, we need to be able to talk about metainferences. For
example the deduction theorem, which is often presented as something like “if A $ B, then
$ A Ñ B” can be understood as a metainference:
A$B
$AÑB
Metainferences are also useful in comparing features of different logics. For example,
intuitionistic logic has the property that if $ AV B, then either $ A or $ B. Classical logic
does not have this property because, for example, $ p _ ␣p is valid but neither $ p nor
$ ␣p is.
One way to understand this difference is in terms of metainferences: the multi-conclusion
metainference
$A_B
$A
$B
is valid in intuitionistic logic, but not in classical logic.
As long as we are in the business of representing inferences that we are interested in
discussing, as the validity curry paradox assumes, it stands to reason that we should be
able to represent metainferences, not just first-order inferences. However, a higher-order
version of the validity curry paradox reappears at the metainferential level. Providing a
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uniform solution to the validity curry paradoxes of different orders proves to be much more
challenging than solving the original validity curry paradox alone.
There has already been some work done on the difficulties of representing metainferential
validity. For example, in [29] introduces the concept of internalization, which is one way for
a logic to represent the validity-preservation of its own metarules. Rosenblatt argues that
substructural theories cannot internalize their own metarules. In [3], Barrio, Rosenblatt and
Tajer show that STV, the nontranstivie strict-tolerant logic with the validity rules VP and
VD, cannot internalize all of its own metarules, and that the most obvious way to strengthen
the validity rules allows the theory to (wrongly) internalize metarules that don’t preserve
validity. In [21], and [22], Hlobil considers an admissibility version of the validity curry
paradox, and argues that the nontrasitive approach should reject the rule VD in order to
better internalize its own metarules. Smilarly, the infinite-premise “external validity curry”
that I introduced in “Infinite-Premise Paradoxes and Contraction” is a sort of metainferential
curry paradox.
In this paper, I show that this difficulty in representing valid metainferences generalizes
beyond the internalization of metarules, or the problems of infinite premises. Even if we
add a separate validity predicate to represent metainferential validity, and allow only finitely
many premises, the validity curry paradox will reappear at the metainferential level.
In this paper I present metainferential versions of the validity curry paradox, and show
that the validity curry phenomenon appears at every level of metainference. The metainferential validity curry does not involve Cut or Contraction; it instead involves higher level
analogues that are validated by current substructural logics like those of [6] and [42]. But
the problems do not end there: the problem reappears at the level of metametainferences,
and metametametainferences, and so on ad infinitum. I argue that this poses a problem for
substructural approaches to semantic paradoxes, and that in particular it threatens to undermine their ability to provide a uniform solution to the semantic paradoxes. It also poses
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a problem for non-substructural approaches, and may force us to rethink what it means to
provide a uniform solution to these paradoxes.
In section 4.2, I present the notation and metainferential framework that I will use
throughout the paper. In section 4.3, I discuss the validity curry paradox and the substructural solutions to it. In section 4.4, I introduce a metainferential validity curry paradox, and
show that it does not involve the usual Cut or Contraction rules. In section 4.5, I introduce
an infinite hierarchy of metainferential validity curry paradoxes, none of which involve the
Cut or Contraction rules of any lower level. In section 4.6, I discuss what it means to provide
a uniform solution to the validity curry paradoxes in the hierarchy. In sections 4.9 and 4.10,
I argue that giving up either of VP or VD at every level is untenable. In sections 4.7 and
4.8 I argue that giving up Cut or Contraction at every level of inference is worse than giving
up either rule at only the first level. In section 4.11, I reconsider what it means to provide
a uniform solution, and argue that the non-classical logician can reject VP in some cases
and VD in others while still providing a uniform solution. In section 4.12, I conclude that
the metainferential hierarchy of validity curry paradoxes poses new problems all approaches
to semantic paradox, but that we do not need to move to a substructural logic to provide a
uniform solution. I close with some remarks about the future of metainferential paradoxes.

4.2

Notation

When introducing the validity curry paradox in [4], Beall and Murzi consider a validity predicate that takes as arguments names for formulas, such as xAy for the formula A. However, we
are often interested in arguments with multiple premises and multiple conclusions. We could
always conjoin premises and disjoin conclusions to get one premise and one conclusion, so
that e.g. A, B $ C, D becomes A ^ B $ C _ D. But this will not work in all cases. In supervaluationist logics, Γ $ A, B is not equivalent to Γ $ A _ B. And in subvaluationist logics,
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A, B $ ∆ is not equivalent to A ^ B $ ∆. In such cases, the one-premise-and-one-conclusion
format will fail to capture all of the inferences that we want to capture.
With that in mind, it would be better to have names for finite multisets of formulas.4 I
will take xΓy to be the name for the multiset Γ, take e.g. xrA, A, B, ...sy to be the name for
the multiset rA, A, B...s and xrAsy to be the name for the singleton multiset rAs. When no
confusion can arise, I will drop the square brackets [ ] and just write e.g. xA, A, By.
In addition to names for multisets, we’ll need a way to talk about metainferences, or
inferences between inferences. To do that, we will need names not only for multisets, but for
inferences. To do this, we can think of inferences as ordered pairs of multisets of formulas:
the inference Γ $ ∆ is simply the ordered pair pΓ, ∆q. We can similarly think of (singlepremise and single-conclusion) metainferences as ordered pairs of ordered pairs of multisets,
and metametainferences as ordered pairs of ordered pairs of ordered pairs of multisets, and
so on. As long as we restrict ourselves to finite multisets, a countable language is free to
contain names for every finite multiset of formulas, and every ordered pair of finite multisets,
and every ordered pair of ordered pairs of finite multisets, and so on, without increasing the
cardinality of the language. We can do this via gödel numbering, or by extending the
language with a set of distinguished names for multisets of formulas and ordered pairs of
... ordered pairs of multisets of formulas. In what follows, I will assume that our language
contains such names.
In order to discuss metainferences, and metametainferences, and metametametainferences, and so on, we will need a way to represent metan inferences of arbitrary level n. For
this purpose, we can use higher-level sequents, which take sequents of lower levels as premises.
This was pioneered by Kosta Došen, who introduced higher-level sequent systems for use in
modal logic and other purposes.5 For my purposes in this paper, I will specifically be using
4

If we included names for infinite multisets, then the cardinality of our set of terms would be greater than
the cardinality of our language, which would be a problem.
5
See in particular [10], [11], [12], and [13].
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tools developed in [1], with some terminology from [24] and [35].
Let L be a language, which contain names for finite multisets of formulas, ordered pairs
of finite multisets of formulas, ordered pairs of ordered pairs of finite multisets of formulas,
and so on.
I’ll call L-formulas 0-inferences.
Let a 1-inference be an ordered pair of finite multisets of L-formulae: xΓ, ∆y. I will write
this as Γ ñ1 ∆, and I will write the name for Γ ñ1 ∆ as xΓ ñ1 ∆y.
1-inferences are the usual inferences between sets of formulae, like modus ponens:
A, A Ñ B ñ1 B
Throughout this paper, if the 1-inference ñ A is valid, I will call A a “theorem” of the
logic.
But we also want to consider inferences between inferences, or metainferences, such as
Cut and Contraction:
Γ, A ñ1 ∆
Γ1 ñ1 A, ∆1
Cut
Γ, Γ1 ñ1 ∆, ∆1
Γ, A, A ñ1 ∆
Contraction
Γ, A ñ1 ∆
To do this, we will look not only at 1-inferences, but at 2-inferences. Let a 2-inference
be an ordered pair of multisets of 1-inferences. I will write this as Γ ñ2 ∆, where Γ and ∆
are sets of 1-inferences rather than sets of formulae.
On this notation, Cut becomes:
tΓ, A ñ1 ∆; Γ1 ñ1 A, ∆1 u ñ2 tΓ, Γ1 ñ1 ∆, ∆1 u
And Contraction becomes:
tΓA, A ñ1 ∆u ñ2 tΓ, A ñ1 ∆u
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These are the same metainferences that we’ve always used, just presented in a different
notation. We can use this notation to discuss metainferences of arbitrary levels. For any n,
we can use this notion to consider metan inferences.
Importantly, this gives us a way to construct proofs that a metainference is valid, analogous to the way in which the usual sequent calculus allows us to construct a proof that an
inference is valid.
For all n ă ω, let an n+1-inference be an ordered pair of finite multisets of n-inferences.
1-inferences are inferences between formulas, 2-inferences are the metainferences, 3-inferences
are metametainferences, etc.
For any n ą 0, we can write an n-inference as Γ ñn ∆, where Γ and ∆ are finite multisets
of (n-1)-inferences.
This gives us an infinite hierarchy of metan inferences. At any level of inference n, we can
use this notation to talk about which n-inferences are valid.

4.2.1

A Note on Metainferential Validity

Given a class of models, we can define a notion of validity for 1-inferences by defining a satisfaction relation between models and inferences. For example, we might define the (singleconclusion) classical logic consequence relation $CL over the class of boolean valuations M
as follows:
Γ $CL A iff for all v P M, either vpγq “ 0 for some γ P Γ, or vpAq “ 1
A classical counterexample to an inference Γ $ A is a boolean valuation that assigns 1
to all of the premises, and assigns 0 to the conclusion. A valuation satisfies an inference if
it is not a counterexample. A classically valid 1-inference is an inference that has no such
counterexamples, or equivalently, an inference that is satisfied at every model.
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Given a model-theoretically defined notion of validity for 1-inferences, we can define at
least two notions of validity for 2-inferences: global and local :
Definition 4.2.1. Local Metainferential Validity
A metainference
Γ$∆
Σ$Π
is locally valid iff at every model m, if Γ $ ∆ is satisfied at m, then Σ $ Π is satisfied at
m.
Definition 4.2.2. Global Metainferential Validity
A metainference
Γ$∆
Σ$Π
is globally valid iff if (materially) Γ $ ∆ is valid (satisfied at all models), then Σ $ Π is
valid.
These are both model-theoretic notions of metainferential validity. But there are also
two closely related proof-theoretic notions that we might be interested in:
Definition 4.2.3. Derivable Metainferential Rule
A metainference
Γ$∆
Σ$Π
is a derivable rule iff there exists a proof from Γ $ ∆ to Σ $ Π.
Definition 4.2.4. Admissible Metainferential Rule
A metainference
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Γ$∆
Σ$Π
is an admissible rule iff if (materially) there exists a proof of Γ $ ∆, then there exists a
proof of Σ $ Π.
In general, given a proof theory and a (model-theoretic) semantics for which it is sound
and complete, global validity and admissibility coincide. But local validity and derivable
rules do not necessarily coincide.6
In [1], Barrio, Pailos and Szmuc construct a metainferential hierarchy of strict-tolerant
logics using the local notion of metainferential validity, defined over 3-valued Strong Kleene
models. Their hierarchy is defined in terms of local metainferential validity, but the metainferential arguments that I introduce in this paper could be run using any of these four notions
(and any variations thereof).
In what follows, I will assume that the notion of metainferential validity in play is the
global notion of metainferential validity. This is the more common notion of metainferential
validity; it is the notion involved in the deduction theorem in classical logic, and the Necessitation rule in modal logic. It is also clearly the notion of metainferential validity used in
the derivation of the validity curry paradox; as we will see, the rule Validity Proof (VP) is
only desirable as a global metainference.

4.3

The Validity Curry Paradox

In [4], Beall and Murzi present a validity curry paradox that involves a validity predicate
V alpx, yq, governed by the following rules:7
Validity Proof :
6
7

See [9] for a further discussion of the relationships between these notions of metainferential validity.
Notation changed to match the notation used in this paper.
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Γñ∆
(VP)
ñ V alpxΓy, x∆yq
Validity Detachment:
Γ, V alpxΓy, x∆yq ñ ∆

(VD)

These rules lead to triviality in the presence of the structural rules of Cut and Contraction:8
Γ, A ñ ∆
Γ1 ñ A, ∆1
Cut
Γ, Γ1 ñ ∆, ∆1
Γ, A, A ñ ∆
Contraction
Γ, A ñ ∆
Let π be a sentence that is equivalent to V alpxπy, xKyq. Using this sentence, we can use
Cut, Contraction, and the validity rules to derive ñ K. Thus any logic validating all four
rules is trivial. The derivation has two parts: I’ll call them Part A, and Part B. In general,
noncontractive approaches object to Part A, while nontransitive approaches object to Part
B.9
Part A is a derivation of π ñ K, using only (VD) and Contraction:
π, V alpxπy, xKyq ñ K
π, π ñ K
π ñ K

(VD)
(def. of π)
(Contraction)

Part B uses Part A, along with (VP) and Cut, to derive ñ K:

[Part A]
π ñ K
(VP)
ñ V alpxπy, xKyq
(def. of π)
ñ π
ñ K
8

[Part A]
π ñ K (Cut)

Here I give only the left-side Contraction rule, as the right-side Contraction rule is not directly involved
in the validity curry derivation. But to avoid triviality by rejecting Contraction, we must reject both the
left and right rules.
9
See [37] for an argument that Part A alone is sufficient to cause problems.

CHAPTER 4. VALIDITY CURRY HIERARCHY

90

We can therefore only avoid triviality by giving up VP, VD, Cut, or Contraction.
Some substructuralists have used this to argue that we should give up Cut or Contraction,
moving to a substructural logic. For example, Ripley argues that substructural logics provide
a uniform solution to the validity curry and other paradoxes, while other solutions cannot:
“The nonsubstructuralist, then, must modify the V rules, using yet another finger to plug
yet another hole in the crumbling dike. After all, no negation or implication occurs in the
validity curry argument, so the nonsubstructuralist’s tweaks to negation and implication are
beside the point here. The substructuralist, on the other hand, has already addressed this
problem, since it too depends on both contraction and cut to cause trouble.” [32] (pp.308)
Similarly, Beall and Murzi argue that giving up VP or VD is tantamount to giving up
on talking about validity:
“One avenue of reply... is to reject one of VP and VD, and concede that we don’t have the
resources to talk about validity. This line of response—one of “silence”, as it is sometimes
called—is no more attractive in the case of validity than it is in the case of truth. On the
face of it, we do talk about validity; and we should seek to account for this phenomenon,
rather than deny the data, or deem it incoherent.” [4] (pp. 158).
If this is right, then that leaves only Cut or Contraction as potential culprits, thus leaving
substructural logics as the only game in town. Validity is an important concept; denying
the coherence of validity amounts to denying the coherence of talk about what follows from
what. I take denying the very coherence of validity to be untenable. So if we must reject
one of Cut, Contraction, VP, or VD in order to solve the validity curry paradox, and Beall
and Murzi are right that rejecting VP or VD amounts to giving up on talk of validity, then
our only real options are to reject Cut or Contraction, thus moving to a substructural logic.
I am skeptical that Beall and Murzi are right here. While VP and VD are prima facie
very appealing rules, I see no reason to think that denying either rule mounts to a concession
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that we don’t have the resources to talk about validity. But nevertheless, it is true that the
validity curry paradox poses a difficult problem for non-substructural approaches. However,
as we will see, the validity curry phenomenon can be replicated at higher levels of inference,
resulting in an infinite hierarchy of validity curry paradoxes.
As we will see, none of the four rules involved in the paradox—Cut, Contraction, VP,
and VD—provide a particular appealing route to solving the full hierarchy of validity curry
paradoxes.

4.4

A Metainferential Validity Curry Paradox

Let V al2 px, yq be a predicate that expresses 2-inference (i.e. metainferential) validity. V al2 px, yq
takes as arguments the names of 1-inferences.10 For example, the formula V al2 pxΓ ñ1
∆y, xΣ ñ1 Πyq is the sentence saying that the metainference
Γ ñ1 ∆
Σ ñ1 ∆
is valid.
Like the V al1 predicate, our V al2 predicate will be governed by two analogous rules.
These rules are metametainferences, or 3-inferences:
VP2 :
tΓ ñ1 ∆u ñ2 tΣ ñ1 Πu
ñ2 tñ1 V al2 pxΓ ñ1 ∆y, xΣ ñ1 Πyqu
VD2 :

tΓ ñ1 ∆, ñ1 V al2 pxΓ ñ1 ∆y, xΣ ñ1 Πyqu ñ2 tΣ ñ1 Πu
10

As mentioned in section 4.2, I will assume that, in addition to names for finite multisets, our language
also has names for ordered pairs of finite multisets, i.e. inferences. If one wants to avoid this extra machinery,
one may equivalently take V al2 to be a four-place predicate, taking the names of four multisets as arguments.
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To put the rules in a more familiar notation, VP2 says that if:
Γ ñ1 ∆
Σ ñ1 Π
is valid, then so is:

ñ1 V al2 pxΓ, ∆y, xΣ, Πyq
VD2 says that, for all finite multisets Γ, ∆, Σ, and Π, the following metainference is valid:
Γ ñ1 ∆, ñ1 V al2 pxΓ, ∆y, xΣ, Πyq
Σ ñ1 Π
Here ñ1 V al2 pxΓ, ∆y, xΣ, Πyq is 1-inference that has the empty multiset as its premises,
and V al2 pxΓ, ∆y, xΣ, Πyq as its conclusion.
These rules are analogous to the original VP and VD, and they appear to be just as
difficult to give up. However, VP2 and VD2 lead to triviality if metainferences obey the 2inference analogues of Cut and Contraction. I’ll call these 2-Cut and 2-Contraction. Written
in ñ2 notation, they are:
Γ

Ť
Ť
tA ñ1 Bu ñ2 ∆
Γ1 ñ2 tA ñ1 Bu ∆1
2-Cut
Γ, Γ1 ñ2 ∆, ∆1
Γ

Ť
tA ñ1 B, A ñ1 Bu ñ2 ∆
Ť
2-Contraction
Γ tA ñ1 Bu ñ2 ∆

For our current purposes, we do not need to look at these rules in full generality. In the
simplest case, 2-Cut is the metametainference (3-inference) from

A ñ1 B
and
A ñ1 B
C ñ1 D
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to

C ñ1 D
Whereas in the simplest case, 2-Contraction is the metametainference (3-inference) from

A ñ1 B
A ñ1 B
C ñ1 D
to
A ñ1 B
C ñ1 D
2-Cut, 2-Contraction, VP2 and VD2 lead to triviality, even without Cut and Contraction
at the lower levels. We can see this by looking at a metainferential version of the validity
curry paradox.
The 2-inference version of the validity curry paradox is derived analogously to the original
validity curry paradox. It too can be divided into a Part A and a Part B.
Let π2 be the sentence equivalent to V al2 pxñ1 π2 y, xñ1 Kyq. Intuitively, this sentence
says that the metainference from ñ1 π2 to ñ1 K is valid, where ñ1 π2 is the 1-inference
with no premises and π2 as its conclusion.
Part A uses VD2 and 2-Contraction to derive tñ1 π2 u ñ2 tñ1 Ku:
tñ1 π2 , ñ1 V al2 pxñ1 π2 y, xñ1 Kyqu ñ2 tñ1 Ku
tñ1 π2 , ñ1 π2 u ñ2 tñ1 Ku
(2-Cont)
tñ1 π2 u ñ2 tñ1 Ku
So from VD2 and 2-Contraction alone, it follows that
ñ1 π 2
ñ1 K

pV D2 q
(def. π2 )
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is a valid metainference.
We can then use this in Part B, to derive the 2-sequent ñ2 tñ1 Ku using VP2 and 2-Cut.
Part B:
[Part A]
tñ1 π2 u ñ2 tñ1 Ku
(V P2 )
[Part A]
ñ2 tñ1 V al2 pxñ1 π2 y, xñ1 Kyqu
(def. π2 )
ñ2 tñ1 π2 u
tñ1 π2 u ñ2 tñ1 Ku
ñ2 tñ1 Ku

(2-Cut)

Thus ñ2 ñ1 K is a provably valid 2-inference, regardless of what K might be. This is
a problem. I assume that our metainferences are sound, in the sense that ñ2 tΓ ñ1 ∆u
entails Γ ñ1 ∆. If so, then in the presence of weakening, we will have Γ ñ1 ∆ for any
Γ and any (nonempty) ∆. Therefore our logic is trivial, even if the logic is noncontractive
or nontransitive in the usual sense. The paradox does not involve Cut or Contraction at
the first inferential level, and so cannot be solved by the same substructural means as the
original validity curry paradox.
But the problems do not stop there. As we will see in the next section, this phenomenon
reoccurs at every level of metan inference. At each level, the paradoxical derivation does not
involve Cut or Contraction of any lower level.

4.5

An Infinite Hierarchy of Validity Curry Paradoxes

This metainferential version of the validity curry paradox can be recreated at every inferential
level, ad infinitum. Here is the basic strategy:
Given a sentence ϕ, let ϕ0 := ϕ, let ϕ1 := ñ1 ϕ, let ϕ2 := ñ2 tñ1 tϕuu, and so on such
that ϕn := ñn ϕn´1 . Note that we have names for each of these in our language; let xϕn y be
the name for ϕn .
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For each level of inference n ą 0, let V aln px, yq be a predicate meant to represent the
validity relation for n-inferences, which takes names for (n-1)-inferences as arguments. Each
V aln px, yq will obey two rules analogous to (VP) and (VD), which I’ll call (VPn ) and (VDn ).
Letting Γ and ∆ be (finite multisets of) (n-1)-inferences, these rules are:
V Pn :
Γ ñn ∆
VPn
ñn V aln pxΓy, x∆yqn´1
V Dn :

Γ, V aln pxΓy, x∆yqn´1 ñn ∆

VDn

where V aln pxΓy, x∆yqn´1 is the (n-1)-inference ñn´1 ñn´2 ... ñ1 V aln pxΓy, x∆yq.
For each level n, we introduce a self-referential n-validity curry sentence. Let πn be a
sentence equivalent to V aln pxpπn qn´1 y, xKn´1 yq
As before, we can divide the derivation into a Part A and a Part B:
Part A uses n-Contraction and VDn to derive pπn qn´1 ñn Kn´1
VDn

tpπn qn´1 , V aln pxpπn qn´1 y, xKn´1 yqn´1 u ñn tKn´1 u
def.
tpπn qn´1 , pπn qn´1 u ñn tKn´1 u
n-Contraction
tpπn qn´1 u ñn tKn´1 u

of πn

Part B uses n-Cut and VPn to derive Kn :

[Part A]
tpπn q u ñn tKn´1 u
(VPn )
ñn tV aln pxpπn qn´1 y, xKn´1 yqn´1 u
(def. of πn )
ñn tπnn´1 u
ñn tKn´1 u
n´1

[Part A]
ñn tKn´1 u

tπnn´1 u

(n-Cut)
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We can therefore prove ñn ... ñ1 K, regardless of what K is. So if we accept all of
n-Cut, n-Contraction, VPn and VDn at any inferential level n, the logic will be trivial. This
derivation schema gives us an infinite metainferential hierarchy of validity curry paradoxes.
On this schema, setting n “ 1 gives us the original validity curry paradox, while n “ 2 gives
us the metainferential validity curry paradox from section 4.4. Higher ns will give us higher
order validity curries.
Notice that the derivation for level n does not involve k-Cut or k-Contraction for any
level k ă n; nor does it involve (VPk ) or (VDk ) for any k ă n. At any level n, the paradox
cannot be solved by rejecting the structural or operation rules of lower levels.

4.6

The Principle of Uniform Solution

Substructural approaches aim to provide a uniform solution to semantic paradoxes, including
paradoxes of validity like the validity curry paradox. Defenders of these approaches argue
that they provide a uniform solution, because they block every paradoxical argument at the
exact same step. Other nonclassical approaches do not provide a uniform solution, because
they must block negation rules for the liar, conditional rules for the curry, and so on. See,
for example, Ripley [34]:
“The real problem with [nonsubstructural approaches]... is this: the nonsubstructuralist deals with the paradoxes piecemeal, missing the general features that are
allowing them to arise in the first place. But paradox runs deeper than any particular vocabulary. Tinkering with negation or conditional rules might prevent
paradoxes involving negations and conditionals from arising, but it doesn’t come
to grips with the general phenomenon.”
The metainferential hierarchy of validity curries suggests that providing a uniform solution is not quite as simple as blocking one rule. Simply blocking Cut or Contraction at the
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first level of inference will not block the metainferential paradoxes of higher levels. However,
it is not a difficult leap to suppose that those who give up Cut at the first level may also
be willing to give up Cut at higher levels; similarly for those who reject Contraction. If
Contraction is problematic at one level, it stands to reason that it might be problematic at
any level. Similarly for Cut.
In practice, defenders of substructural logics vary on this point. Ripley [31] argues against
applying the nontransitive ST approach to metainferences, opting to keep metainferences
transitive. Meanwhile, Weber [40] and Wansing and Priest [39] defend noncontractive logics
that do not validate metainferential Contraction. But regardless of what particular substructuralists have so far defended, one would need an awfully strict notion of uniformity to
deny that rejecting either Cut or Contraction at every level was a uniform solution. I take
it, then, that giving up either VP, VD, Cut, or Contraction at every level suffices to provide
a uniform solution.
But therein lies the difficulty. In the following sections, I will argue that none of the four
rules can easily be given up at every level, even for those who are already comfortable giving
up one of the rules at level 0. The metainferential hierarchy of validity curry paradoxes
therefore creates problems even for logics that have already solved the original validity curry
paradox.
Furthermore, I take it that we do in fact need to provide a uniform solution to all of the
validity curry paradoxes in the hierarchy. It seems clear that these validity curry paradoxes
are essentially the same problem reoccurring at different levels of inference. Surely, the
validity curry paradoxes of various metainferential levels are all the same kind of paradox,
in the sense of Priest’s Principle of Uniform Solution: “same kind of paradox, same kind of
solution” [26]. These paradoxes all have the exact same structure, use analogous rules, and
they all involve validity. As such, these paradoxes require a uniform solution: if Cut is the
problem at level 1, then Cut must be the problem “all the way up”. It would seem fairly
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ad hoc to solve the nth validity curry by rejecting Cutn , but solve the n ` 1th validity curry
by rejecting VPn . If one is going to solve the full metainferential hierarchy of validity curry
paradoxes, then one must reject either VPn , VDn , Cutn , or Contractionn at every level n.
Therefore if the substructuralist wants to provide a uniform solution to the validity curry
paradoxes, they must reject either Cut or Contraction for every level of inference.
Similarly, if the non-substructuralist is going to give a uniform solution to the validity
curry paradoxes, without rejecting either Cut or Contraction (at any level), it appears that
they will have to give up VP at every level, or give up VD at every level. If detachment is
the problem at one level, surely it must be the problem at all levels.
However, none of these options are particularly appealing. In the next four sections, I
will argue that giving up any of these rules at every metainferential level is more problematic
than giving up any of the rules at one level would be. I then suggest that we may need to
rethink what it means to give a uniform solution to these paradoxes.

4.7

Giving up Cut at every level

Defenders of the nontransitive approach solve the validity curry paradox and other paradoxes
by rejecting Cut. In the case of the validity curry paradox, they avoid triviality by accepting
both $ π and π $ K while rejecting $ K.
At least some defenders of the nontransitive approach have resisted the move to nontransitive metainferences. Ripley argues that the defender of ST as a useful consequence
relation “has thereby taken no commitments at all” regarding metainferential consequence
[31]. Ripley argues that one can accept the valid 1-inferences of ST as the right set of valid
1-inferences, while still remaining agnostic between different notions of n-validity at levels
n ą 1. In particular, Ripley argues that the defender of ST is not obligated to move to the
logic that is nontransitive at every inferential level.
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However, the metainferential validity curry paradoxes pose a problem for Ripley’s position. Ripley and other defenders of ST frequently appeal to the fact that ST provides a
uniform solution to semantic paradoxes: ST solves all of the semantic paradoxes by rejecting
Cut. Even if Ripley is right that in principle one can endorse the validities of one level while
remaining agnostic about higher levels, the defender of ST cannot remain agnostic about
higher levels while providing a uniform solution to semantic paradoxes.
If defenders of the nontransitive approach want to provide a uniform solution to the
validity curry paradoxes, then they will need to give up n-Cut at every level n. They simply
cannot remain agnostic about metainferences. There are already formal systems that do
this available in the literature.11 Unfortunately, these are already known to have serious
problems.
[1] and [24] introduce a logic which applies the ST nontransitive phenomenon at every
metainferential level. If the defender of ST—the most common nontransitive approach to semantic paradoxes in recent years—wants to provide a uniform solution to all of the paradoxes
in the validity curry hierarchy, this is the logic that they will need to use.
Unfortunately, this logic is already known to have serious problems. Scambler [35] discusses this logic, and argues convincingly that it puts us in a position much like that of
Lewis Carroll’s Tortoise: namely, it calls inferences valid but does not allow us to use those
inferences. The set of valid 1-inferences is not closed under the set of valid 2-inferences, the
set of valid 2-inferences is not closed under the valid 3-inferences, and so on.
This means that we can start a sequent calculus proof with all valid premises, make
nothing but valid metainferences, and still end up with an invalid conclusion.
This is already true of ST: if we start with true premises, and run an argument with all
11

See [1], [2] and [24] for the technical machinery to construct logics that are not closed under Cut at
any metainferential level. These build a hierarchy of nontransitive logics which have the same validities of
classical logic at every metainferential level, but which are not closed under Cut at any inferential level.
Fitting, in [17], [18], and [19], shows that this can be generalized far beyond classical logic.
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valid inferences, then we can still end up with an false conclusion. In ST—with a transparent
truth predicate added to the language—the inference from 0 “ 0 to the liar sentence is valid,
and the inference from the liar sentence to 0 “ 1 is valid. If we were to actually make those
inferences, then we could prove 0 “ 1 from 0 “ 0. This is obviously ridiculous.
But, as I argued in “Supervaluations and the Strict-Tolerant Hierarchy”, this is not a
problem for ST as long as the ST 1-inferences are not understood as true inferences that
we can make. In Ripley’s bilateralist interpretation of ST, these “inferences” are really
positions: they are pairs of assertions and denials. We can use the metainferences in ST to
prove which pairs of assertions and denials are incoherent. This is the value of ST: it is not
in making inferences from one sentence to another, but in making (meta)inferences from one
position to another.
The problem with rejecting Cut at every metainferential level is that it leaves us with
no true inferences. The logic ST is transitive at the metainferential level, and so we can
actually use the valid metainferences to reason about the “inferences” (positions) at the first
level. But if we take our metainferences to be nontransitive at every level, then there is no
level left at which we can actually make the inferences that we’re calling valid.
This puts the nontransitive approach into a much worse position than it was in at the
first level. The use a logic as a logic, we need to be able to string valid inferences together
to construct proofs. If defenders of the nontransitive approach aim to provide a uniform
solution to the semantic paradoxes by blocking Cut at every inferential level, they will end
up with what Scambler calls the “Tortoise logic”, and be unable to actually use their logic
by making valid inferences.
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Giving up Contraction at every level

If defenders of the noncontractive approach want to block all of the validity curry paradoxes
in the hierarchy at the same step of the argument, then they will need to reject n-Contraction
at every inferential level. This makes the noncontractive approach much less appealing.
Although the noncontractive approach rejects contraction in general, defenders of the
approach can take some solace in the fact that there are forms of contraction that are still
acceptable. For example, [5] point out that Cut allows the noncontractivist to contract on
theorems:
ñA

Γ, A, A ñ ∆
Cut
Γ, A ñ ∆.

Thus as long as we have ñ A, we can in effect contract on A.
Mares and Paoli [23] make a similar point. They distinguish between internal and external
consequence. Roughly, A is an internal consequence of B if A $ B is valid. A is an external
consequence of B iff
$A
$B
is valid. The Contraction rule that noncontractivists reject is contraction for internal consequence. In defending their noncontractive system, Mares and Paoli argue that we can
tolerate the failure of contraction in internal consequence, because we do get some contraction back: external consequence contracts. Mares and Paoli distinguish two senses in which
we can say A “follows from” Γ. The first sense they call “information extraction”. On this
sense, A follows from Γ iff “given the rules of the logic at issue, we can extract the information that A from the combined information provided by the sentences in Γ” [23]. The second
notion they call “information preservation”. On this sense, A follows from Γ iff “Γ yields
grounds for asserting A; i.e. whenever we accept Γ we are committed to accepting A” [23].
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Mares and Paoli argue that Contraction fails for the first sense, because in some cases
you need two applications of a premise or axiom in a proof. Sometimes there just is no
proof in which the premise is applied only once. Thus, in this sense of “follows from”, there
are cases where B follows from A, A but not from A. Thus Mares and Paoli argue that
Contraction fails for the first sense of information extraction, even though it does not fail
for information preservation. Mares and Paoli take internal consequence to be the right
consequence for information extraction, and they take external consequence to be the right
notion of consequence for information preservation.
However, none of this applies if the noncontractivist must reject Contraction at every
metainferential level. Contracting on theorems and external consequence contraction both
require metainferential contraction. External consequence is just a special case of internal
metainferential consequence. So if metainferential internal consequence doesn’t contract,
then neither does external (1-)consequence. Once we give that up, there is no form of
contraction that the noncontractive approach can accept. In Mares and Paoli’s terminology,
there is no form of information preservation that the noncontractive approach can accept.
The noncontractive approach must reject information preservation as a coherent notion.
This problematic, for many reasons. One reason is that information preservation seems to
be a perfectly coherent notion, and a very useful one at that. If one’s approach to semantic
paradoxes forces us to reject the notion as incoherent, so much the worse for one’s approach
to semantic paradoxes. Another, more practical reason this is problematic is that it means
that we have no easy way to add non-logical axioms to our system. In the presence of
metainferential contraction, we could take A to be an axiom by adding ñ1 A to our logic,
and that sufficed for us to use A as many times as we liked.
Once we give up 2-Contraction, it doesn’t just matter how many times we use A in a
proof; it matters how many times we use ñ1 A too. If we want to add non-logical axioms
to our logical system, as we often want to do, we have two ways to add them (in a sequent
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calculus presentation): we can start with our axioms Γ on the left hand side of a sequent,
and see what we can prove on the right side. Or, we can add ñ1 γ for every γ P Γ to our
sequent calculus, and see what sequents we can prove from them.
The former involves reasoning from the axioms using internal consequence, and the latter
involves using external consequence.
If we have 2-Contraction, then adding ñ1 γ for all γ P Γ allows us to use each γ as many
times as we want in derivations; we can always use Cut to remove excess γs from sequents.
For example, if we prove γ, γ, ñ1 ∆, we can use Cut twice to get ñ1 ∆:
ñ1 γ
ñ1 γ

γ, γ ñ1 ∆
γ ñ1 ∆

ñ1 ∆
However, if we drop 2-Contraction, this fails. Adding ñ1 γ doesn’t allow us to use γ as
many times as we want, because we can no longer use ñ1 γ as many times as we want to
remove excess γs from sequents. Inferences can be “used up” in proofs just like sentences in
noncontractive proofs. If we add ñ1 γ to our logical system, it will matter how many times
we add it. If Γ, γ, γ ñ1 B is valid, and we add only one occurrence of ñ1 γ to our system,
then Γ ñ1 B may still not be valid. This problem repeats at every metainferential level; for
any n and any A, adding ñn ñn´1 ... ñ1 A once will give different results than adding it
twice. There is no level n that allows us to add an n-theorem to the logic and freely use the
theorem more than once.
The problem is that often what we are interested in are the consequence of a collection
of assumptions, or a collection of nonlogical axioms, such as those of ZFC. In at least some
contexts, we are interested in which we can prove from a sentence or collection of sentences
when we have the freedom to use them as many times as we’d like. If we only give up
Contraction at the first level, as Mares and Paoli [23], Zardini [42], and Cintula and Paoli
[5] do, then we can do this by adding ñ A to our system for every axiom A that we want.
But once we give up Contraction at every metainferential level, there is no way to do this.
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What the considerations in this section show is that this can never be done in a noncontractive logic, at least if the logic aims to provide a uniform solution to the validity curry
paradoxes. Noncontractive logics do not allow us to introduce nonlogical axioms or other
assumptions with the explicit approval to use them as many times as we’d like. This means
that, in contexts in which we want to use sentences as many times as we’d like, such as when
asking about the consequences of ZFC or other mathematical sets of axioms, we cannot use
a noncontractive logic. Noncontractive logics are, therefore at best incomplete solutions.
Whatever their merits may be, they do not tell us how to solve the paradoxes in contexts
where we want to discover consequences of a set of nonlogical axioms or assumptions.

4.9

Giving up VP at every level

At first glance, VP looks like the most obvious step to block:
Validity Proof :
Γñ∆
(VP)
ñ V alpxΓy, x∆yq
As Field points out in [14], this is a bit odd. If V alpx, yq is meant to represent ñ, then
validity proof has one occurrence of a validity symbol in the premise (ñ), but two in the
conclusion (ñ and V al). The conclusion of the metainference VP is therefore, at least on
many consequence relations, a strictly stronger claim than the premise. Compare this to the
naive truth rules, such as:
AñB
A ñ T xBy
On most theories of truth, the conclusion here is not stronger than the premise. The
premise and conclusion are equivalent; that is at least part of why it is so difficult to reject
the inference.
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But in the case of VP, the conclusion does appear to be something stronger than the
premise, which gives us room to reject VP. The conclusion appears to say more than simply
that the inference from Γ to ∆ is valid; it says that the validity of the inference is a theorem
in our consequence relation ñ.
It’s not at all obvious that we need VP in order to have a naive theory of validity,
because it’s not obvious that a naive theory of validity demands that we be able to prove the
relevant V al-sentence for every valid inference. What we really want is to be able to assert
that V al-sentence, or for that V al-sentence to be true.
Unfortunately, as Shapiro [37] has shown, even this weaker version of VP will lead to
paradox. Shapiro introduces a rule that he calls VT:
(VT) V alpxAy, xByq is true iff A $ B.
Shapiro shows that replacing VP with the right-to-left direction of still suffices for paradox. Recall that part A of the derivation gives us π ñ K:
π, V alpxπy, xKyq ñ K
π, π ñ K
π ñ K

(VD)
(def. of π)
(Contraction)

Applying Shapiro’s VT rule, we get:
V alpxπy, xKyq is true
But V alpxπy, xKyq is equivalent to π, so this means that we have
π is true
We therefore have a valid inference π $ K, which has a true premise. If validity is truth
preserving, then K is true, and we again have triviality.
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One potential issue here is that not everyone will accept that validity is truth-preserving.12
Another issue is that not everyone will accept that theorems ñ A are true.13
However, we can formalize the argument without introducing a natural language truth
predicate into the mix, by introducing a standard model. Let’s assume that we have a
standard model, which I will denote by α, that gets all of the (first-level) validity facts right.
In other words, α , V alpxAy, xByq iff A ñ B.
Part A of the argument is unchanged, and again gives us π ñ K. Given our assumption
about the standard model, this gives us:
α , V alpxπy, xKyq
But V alpxπy, xKyq is equivalent to π, so this means that we have
α,π
Given VD, we have π, V alpxπy, xKyq ñ K. We therefore have:
α,K
Therefore the standard model is trivial. This means that even without VP in its usual
form, we cannot have even a single model that gets the validity facts right. This poses a
problem. Part of why we want to formally represent validity is to provide a model (in the
scientists’ sense of the term) of our own, pre-formal notion of real validity. If we cannot even
have a single model (in the logician’s sense) that gets the validity facts right, then we have
simply failed to model (in the scientists’ sense) real validity.
Defenders of nontransitive and noncontractive approaches will argue that this version
of the argument implicitly uses Cut and Contraction, both of which are somewhat hidden
by the switch to reasoning about satisfaction at α. Having a model theory with a single
12
13

See especially [16] and [15].
See especially [33] and [32].
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notion of truth-in-the-model is incompatible with both approaches, and so by reasoning
about such a model I am making certain assumptions that neither flavor of substructuralist
will accept. I am willing to concede that point; this argument does not directly threaten the
noncontractive or nontransitive approaches.
However, this argument and Shapiro’s argument do threaten any approach that aims to
block the validity curry paradoxes by rejecting VP at every level. Rejecting the usual form
of VP is not sufficient to block the validity curry paradox at the first level of inference. If we
aim to reject VP, we must further deny that there can be any notion of a standard model
that gets all of the validity facts right. Furthermore, we must either deny that A ñ B entails
that it is true that the inference from A to B is valid, or we must accept that there are valid
inferences with true premises with conclusions that we cannot accept on pain of triviality.
Note that this same reasoning does not apply to the metainferential validity curries. To
see why, let’s examine the 2-validity curry again. In part A, we derive tñ1 π2 u ñ2 tñ1 Ku.
Let’s suppose that we replace VP with either Shapiro’s VT or the standard-model-restricted
version of VP, and thus we have either:
V al2 pxñ1 π2 y, xñ1 Kyq is true
or:
α , V al2 pxñ1 π2 y, xñ1 Kyq
Thus we have the truth of the V al-sentence, or at least truth-in-the-standard-model of
the V al-sentence. What we do not have is the theoremhood of the V al-sentence. Without
that, we cannot use tñ1 π2 u ñ2 tñ1 Ku to derive K or ñ1 K or ñ2 ñ1 K.
Thus at higher levels of validity, rejecting VPn in favor of one of these weaker rules merely
forces us to say that the V al-sentence is true but not a theorem. Perhaps that is a somewhat
awkward position, but it is nowhere near as problematic as the position that rejecting VP
at the first level would put us in.
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However, if we must provide a uniform solution to the validity curry paradoxes by blocking
the same step of the argument at every level, then the problems for rejecting VP at level 1
suffice to rule out rejecting VP as an option. We must instead look elsewhere.

4.10

Giving up VD at every level

Giving up VD at first appears more difficult than giving up VP, but the move has its
defenders. Field [14] argues that VD fails for at least some notions of validity, while while
Hlobil [21] argues that the nontransitive approach should reject VD.
However, these only consider VD at the first level. Rejecting VD at higher levels of
the validity curry paradox is much harder. Because unlike rejecting VD at the first level,
rejecting VD at metainferential levels results in false theorems.
Consider the instance of VD for the 2-validity curry paradox:
tñ1 π2 , ñ1 V al2 pxñ1 π2 y, xñ1 Kyqu ñ2 tñ1 Ku
As discussed in section 4.2.1, the notion of metainferential validity under discussion here
is global metainferential validity. So to reject this metainference, we must take the premises
of the metainference to be valid, while denying that the conclusion of the metainference is
valid. That means that we must take
ñπ
and
ñ V al2 pxñ1 π2 y, xñ1 Kyq
to be valid, while denying that
ñK
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is valid. But if ñ π is valid and ñ K is not, then the metainference
ñπ
ñK
cannot be valid. And yet,
ñ V al2 pxñ1 π2 y, xñ1 Kyq
is valid.
This means that we have a false theorem: the metainference from ñ π to ñ K is not
valid, yet the sentence saying that it’s valid is a theorem of our logic.
Some, such as Ripley [34], do not claim that the theorems of their logic are true. Ripley
presents a bilateralist view according to which the theorems of ST are simply the sentences
which it is incoherent to deny; we have no obligation to accept them. But this bilateralist
response is not satisfying, particularly when the theorem is something we absolutely can
deny. If we reject this case of (VD), then it is a simple and straightforward fact about the
logic that the metainference from ñ π to ñ K is not valid. Ripley’s bilateralist picture (on
which denying A is equivalent to asserting ␣A) then tells us that it is incoherent to assert
basic facts about our logic.
That seems unreasonable. Even if we are not committed to accept the theorems of
our logic—which, for the record, I think we are—we are certainly free to coherently assert
demonstrable facts about our logic.
In short, giving up VD in the metainferential case seems to be an untenable solution.
As a result, even if giving up VD appears to be a good option in the original validity curry
paradox, rejecting VD “all the way up” is not a tenable uniform solution to the validity
curry paradoxes at all levels.
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Rethinking Uniformity

On one notion of uniform solution, a uniform solution to the validity curry paradoxes would
have to involve blocking the same step of the argument in every case. This is the notion
of uniformity on which substructural logics allegedly provide a uniform solution to semantic
paradoxes, while other non-classical solutions allegedly do not provide a uniform solution.
However, blocking the same step of the validity curry argument at every level of inference
is not at all appealing. Rejecting Cut at every level leaves us with what Scambler calls
the “Tortoise Logic”, unable to make the inferences that we accept as valid. Rejecting
Contraction at every level leaves us with no way to add non-logical axioms and use them
freely in arguments. Rejecting VP at every level fails to solve the paradox at the first level,
and rejecting VD at every level requires accepting false theorems about metainferential
inferences.
This means that we may need to rethink what it would mean to provide a uniform
solution to the paradoxes of the validity curry hierarchy. To that end, it is worth noting that
the validity curry paradox of the first level involves a different notion of validity than the
metainferential validity curry paradoxes. As I noted in 4.2.1, there are multiple notions of
metainferential validity that we might use. There are the semantic notions of local and global
validity, and the proof-theoretic notions of derivable rules and admissible rules. I said that
the notion of metainferential validity in play was the global notion. But the notion of validity
at the first level—the notion of validity between (multisets of) sentences—is distinctly not
a global notion of validity. Recall the various definitions metainferential validity:
Definition 4.11.1. Local Metainferential Validity
A metainference
Γ$∆
Σ$Π
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is locally valid iff at every model m, if Γ $ ∆ is satisfied at m, then Σ $ Π is satisfied at
m.
Definition 4.11.2. Global Metainferential Validity
A metainference
Γ$∆
Σ$Π
is globally valid iff if (materially) Γ $ ∆ is valid (satisfied at all models), then Σ $ Π is
valid.
These are both model-theoretic notions of metainferential validity. But there are also
two closely related proof-theoretic notions that we might be interested in:
Definition 4.11.3. Derivable Metainferential Rule
A metainference
Γ$∆
Σ$Π
is a derivable rule iff there exists a proof from Γ $ ∆ to Σ $ Π.
Definition 4.11.4. Admissible Metainferential Rule
A metainference
Γ$∆
Σ$Π
is an admissible rule iff if (materially) there exists a proof of Γ $ ∆, then there exists a
proof of Σ $ Π.
We could easily consider analogous notions for regular, non-meta validity. Instead of
using the notion of satisfaction-at-a-model, we simply use the notion of truth-in-a-model.
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Definition 4.11.5. Local 1-Validity
An inference
Γ$∆
is locally valid iff at every model m, if every γ P Γ is true at m, then some δ P ∆ is true
at m.
Definition 4.11.6. Global 1-Validity
An inference
Γ$∆
is globally valid iff if (materially) every γ P Γ is valid (true in all models), then some
δ P ∆ is valid.
Definition 4.11.7. Derivable 1-Rule
An inference
Γ$∆
is a derivable rule iff there exists a proof from Γ to some δ P ∆.
Definition 4.11.8. Admissible 1-Rule
An inference
Γ$∆
is an admissible rule iff if (materially) there exists a proof of γ for all γ P Γ, then there
exists a proof of δ for some δ P ∆.
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All four of these notions of 1-validity are perfectly coherent notions. However, it’s clear
that ordinarily, the notions of 1-validity that we care about are the local and derivable
versions. These are the model-theoretic and proof-theoretic notions of validity that we are
most familiar with for 1-inferences.
As such, there is a distinction to be drawn between the validity curry paradox at the first
level of inference, and the validity curry paradoxes at the higher levels. As presented above,
the first level uses a local or derivable notion of validity, while the metainferential versions
use a global or admissible notion of validity.
As such, although the paradoxical arguments of every level have the same structure, and
are syntactically analogous, there is a potentially significant difference between the notions
of validity involved.
I propose that a uniform solution to the validity curry paradoxes does not require that
the same step of the argument be blocked for every notion of validity involved. In particular,
I think that we are free to block VP for the global notions of validity (at any level), and free
to block VD for the local notions of validity (at every level).
Note that the definitions for global and admissible validity are material conditionals.
This means that whatever solution to the curry paradox we already accept for the material
conditional should also apply to the global and admissible versions of the validity curry (at
any level). For the paracomplete approach, this means rejecting Conditional Proof (CP),
which would translate here to rejecting (VP). Whatever justifications the paracomplete theorist has offered for the failure of (CP) for the material conditional, those should transfer
automatically to global and admissible validity curries.
Meanwhile, the local and derivable definitions above are distinctly not material conditionals. The definition of a derivable rule is an existential claim: there exists a proof. The
definition of the local notion is a sort of modal claim: at all models, a certain condition holds.
As such, solutions for the material conditional curry will not automatically carry over to the
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local and derivable versions of validity curry.
For the local and derivable notions, I believe that the problem in the validity curry
argument is VD. Consider the following natural deduction presentation of the validity curry
argument, as it applies to 1-validity:
1

π

Ass.

2

V alpxπy, xKyq

1 (def of π)

3

K

VD 1, 2

4

V alpxπy, xKyq

VP 1-3

5

π

4 (def of π)

6

K

VD 4,5

Since π is equivalent to (or just is) V alpxπy, xKyq, we have effectively assumed that the
inference from π to K is valid. Using VD inside that assumption is, in effect, making the
inference from π to K. But assuming hypothetically that the inference is valid does not justify
making the inference. We should only make inferences that are actually valid, not inferences
that we have hypothetically assumed to be valid. If the inference from π to K is not valid,
then (since local validity is essentially a claim about logical necessity) the assumption that it
is valid amounts to a counterlogical assumption, and the use of VD under that assumption
amounts to the use of an invalid inference. We should therefore reject VD, because in at
least some cases it licenses the use of invalid inferences in proofs.
VD looks even worse on the derivable notion of validity. On this notion, the assumption
of π is effectively an assumption that a certain proof exists. The application of VD under
the assumption allows us to infer K from π as if there were such a proof, but there may be
no such proof. We have only assumed that there is a proof, and then inferred as if there
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were one. This is illegitimate. We can infer K from π when there is a proof, not when we
have assumed that there is a proof.
Note that this reasoning against VD does not apply to the global or admissible notions
of validity: on these notions, the application of VD is just an application of modus ponens
(MP) for the material conditional. The problem, at least for the paracomplete approach, is
the application of VP, which is in actuality an application of Conditional Proof.
I do not mean to propose that this explanation of the phenomenon will be acceptable
to every non-classical approach; in particular, paraconsistent approaches that reject MP
and accept CP for the material conditional will reject the approach that I’ve outlined. The
important point is rather that the non-substructural approaches can give a uniform solution
to the validity curry paradoxes, and can do so without having to block the same step of the
argument in every version.

4.12

Conclusion

Substructural approaches to semantic paradoxes face a problem. They aim to provide a
uniform solution to all of the paradoxes: give up either Cut or Contraction, and every
paradox will fall. However, the situation is not so simple. There are metainferential validity
curry paradoxes, none of which use Cut or Contraction of any lower level of inference. Giving
up Cut or Contraction of the first level of inference, as the substructural approaches have so
far done, will not solve these paradoxes.
To solve the metainferential validity curry paradoxes, sub nontransitive and noncontractive approaches must reject the metainferential versions of Cut or Contraction at every
inferential level. This makes the nontransitive and noncontractive approaches much less
appealing. Giving up Cut or Contraction at every level of inference leaves us unable to
introduce non-logical axioms and discover their consequences in the way that we often to do
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when we use a logic.
Furthermore, the notion of uniform solution that defenders of substructural approaches
often assume is a problematic one. Substructural approaches are often defended by appealing to the fact that they block every paradox at the same step, while other non-classical
approaches must reject different rules to prevent different paradoxes. If I am right that
the substructural approaches do not solve the paradoxes in full generality, and do not solve
the paradoxes in contexts in which we want to discover the consequences of non-logical axioms, then this notion of uniformity used to defend substructural logics is simply mistaken.
Neither VP nor VD can tenably be rejected to solve the validity curry paradoxes of every
level. As such, providing a uniform solution to the validity curry paradoxes requires a more
fine-grained notion of uniformity. Different notions of validity will result in different versions
of the validity curry paradox, and each of the validity rules may apply to some notions of
validity but not to all notions of validity.
I close with a look to the future: this paper has introduced metainferential validity curry
paradoxes. In [25], Priest introduces metainferential versions of the liar and conditional
curry paradox. Metainferential paradoxes are a new and exciting area, and there is much
that is still left to be explored. For example, to the best of my knowledge, the possibility of
metainferential set-theoretic paradoxes, and metainferential vagueness paradoxes, have yet
to be investigated. What consequences those investigations may have for substructural and
other non-classical approaches remains to be seen.
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